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RACIAL IMBALANCE, BLACK SEPARATISM, AND 
PERMISSIBLE CLASSIFICATON BY RACE 
Norman Vieira* 
IT may fairly be said that the issue of state and federal power to classify by race presents a constitutional dilemma "of the very 
first importance."1 Although this issue has been raised in many areas, 
the problem of racial imbalance in public schools may best illustrate 
the dilemma, for it involves a direct confrontation of two basic prin-
ciples of equality: 2 that governmental action should be indifferent 
to color3 and that the right to an education should be available to all 
on even terms. The essential task is to reconcile those principles by 
creating equal educational opportunities for disadvantaged minori-
ties without imposing inappropriate burdens upon either the major-
ity or segments of any minority, and without establishing a consti-
tutional rule ·which might support some future inequality. It is a 
task which is characteristic of important social problems both in its 
ease of description and in its resistance to solution. 
The legal challenge to racial imbalance in the schools was pre-
cipitated on May 17, 1954, when the Supreme Court declared that 
"Separate educational facilities are inherently unequal."4 The 
Court's decision brought to an end the eroded doctrine that a state 
could separate students in public schools solely because of their race 
so long as "equal" facilities were provided. The demise of that doc-
trine also cast suspicion on fortuitous imbalance which is often 
produced by imposing a neighborhood attendance plan on segregated 
housing patterns. In succeeding years that suspicion developed into 
a major constitutional and political debate.5 While attention has con-
• Professor of Law, University of Idaho. A.B. 1959, Columbia University; J.D. 
1962, University of Chicago.-Ed. 
1. A. BICKEL, THE LEAST DANGEROUS BRANCH 58 (1962). 
2. For a discussion of recent trends in resolving the more prevalent conflict be-
tween equality and other values, see Kurland, Foreword: "Equal in Origin and Equal 
in Title to the Legislative and Executive Bi-anches of the Government", 78 HARV. 
L. REV. 143 (1964). 
3. The "color-blindness" rule draws on the classic dissent of the first Justice 
Harlan in Plessy v. Ferguson, 163 U.S. 537, 559 (1896), and on the separate opinions 
of a number of other Justices. See, e.g., Kotch v. Board of River Port Pilot Commrs., 
330 U.S. 552, 566 (1947) (Justice Rutledge dissenting). 
4. Brown v. Board of Educ., 347 U.S. 483, 495 (1954). 
5. The literature, nearly all of which concentrates on general policy issues rather 
than on analysis of Supreme Court decisions, is voluminous. Bittker, The Case of 
the Checker-Board Ordinance: An Experiment in Race Relations, 71 YALE L.J. 1387 
(1962); Carter, De Facto School Segregation: An Examination of the Legal and Con-
stitutional Questions Presented, 16 W. REs. L. REv. 502 (1965); Fiss, Racial Imbalance 
in the Public Schools: The Constitutional Concepts, 78 HARY. L. REY. 564 (1965); 
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centrated mainly on the duty of the states to relieve racial imbalance, 
the foremost issues concern permissible rather than mandatory reme-
dial action. The controversy in all its forms has generated much un-
rest and has stimulated efforts to reduce the imbalance through a 
variety of transfer and rezoning' plans which embody racial classifica-
tions. 
Voluntary remedies classifying by race have frequently been up-
held by state and lower federal courts. However, the cases have been 
conspicuously unsuccessful in developing rules of law which would 
not only sustain the action before the court, but adequately differen-
tiate it from invidious uses of racial criteria. Some opinions have de-
manded corrective measures without considering the possibility 
that those measures might themselves run afoul of the Constitution 
if they are based on race, and might be totally ineffective if they 
are not.6 When courts have faced the issue of permissible means, 
their response has usually been conclusory and sometimes disin-
genuous. One court ruled that a determination by the State Com-
missioner of Education that racial balance is essential to sound educa-
tion was unreviewable, but did not explain why an administrative 
judgment favoring segregation would stand in a different posture.7 
Other cases have said only that a school board need not "close its 
eyes" to educational inequality,8 and that it may consider race in 
a "proper" attempt to eliminate imbalance.9 The contention that 
corrective racial action is constitutionally proscribed has been dis-
missed as "unrealistic"10 and the "height of irony."11 Many courts 
have been content to observe that the effects of de facto segregation 
are similar to those of de jure segregation, and to rely on other 
lower court cases which upheld remedial racial classification with 
Horowitz, Unseparate but Unequal-The Emerging Fourteenth Amendment Issue in 
Public School Education, 13 UCLA L. R.Ev. 1147 (1966); Kaplan, Segregation Litiga• 
tion and the Schools-Part II: The General Northern Problem, 58 Nw. U. L. R.Ev. 
157 (1963); Maslow, De Facto Public School Segregation, 6 V1LL. L. R.Ev. 353 (1961); 
Sedler, School Segregation in the North and West: Legal Aspects, 7 ST. Louis L.J. 228 
(1963); Wright, Public School Desegregation: Legal Remedies for De Facto Segrega-
tion, 40 N.Y.U. L. R.Ev. 285 (1965). 
6. E.g., Jackson v. Pasadena City School Dist., 59 Cal. 2d 876, 382 P.2d 878, 31 Cal. 
Rptr. 606 (1963). 
7. In re Vetere v. Allen, 15 N.Y.2d 259, 206 N.E.2d 174, 285 N.Y.S.2d 77, cert. 
denied, 382 U.S. 825 (1965). See also Olson v. Board of Educ., 250 F. Supp. 1000 
(E.D.N.Y. 1966). 
8. Morean v. Board of Educ., 42 N.J. 237, 200 A.2d 97 (1964). 
9. Offermann v. Nitkowski, 248 F. Supp. 129 (W.D.N.Y. 1965), afj'd, 378 F.2d (2d 
Cir. 1967). 
10. Fuller v. Volk, 230 F. Supp. 25 (D.N.J. 1964). 
11. School Comm. v. Board of Educ., 352 Mass. 693, 227 N.E.2d 729 (1967), appeal 
dismissed, 389 U.S. 572 (1968). 
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little more than the same observation.12 The result is a heavy accumu-
lation of decisions permitting the use of racial criteria, but it is an 
accumulation which takes the form of an inverted pyramid.13 
The lower court opinions in this area, and the likelihood of clas-
sification by race in other areas, suggest a need for close review of 
Supreme Court decisions involving state and federal programs drawn 
along racial lines. This Article will examine those decisions to de-
termine the constitutional permissibility of racial classification. It 
will focus specifically on the correction of racial imbalance in the 
schools since that continues to be the subject of great activity 
and interest,14 but a rule concerning classification by race would have 
potential application to jobs, to housing, and even to current pro-
posals for black separatism. The Article will begin with a discussion 
of the School Segregation Cases15 which have been invoked both to 
sustain and to invalidate corrective racial classification. It will then 
review federal discrimination against Japanese-Americans and 
against Indians, as well as the more obscure discrimination found in 
immigration and naturalization laws. It will also consider, in some 
detail, the paradoxical rules governing the discriminatory selection 
of jurors and, in lesser detail, the cases dealing with domestic re-
lations and racial designations.16 A concluding section will discuss 
black separatism and general policy matters relating to the correction 
of imbalance in the schools. The Article assumes throughout that 
the issue of racial classification, which has the capacity either to 
remedy past injustices or to create new ones, cannot be resolved on a 
result-oriented basis. Indeed, in the field of race relations, in which 
action has ranged from assaults on Jim Crow practices to the drive 
12. E.g., Guida v. Board of Educ., 26 Conn. Supp. 121, 213 A.2d 843 (Conn. Super. 
1965); Morean v. Board of Educ., 42 N.J. 237, 200 A.2d 97 (1964). 
13. Opinions invalidating corrective measures that utilize race have been no more 
satisfactory than those reaching the opposite conclusion. See Tometz v. Board of 
Educ., No. 40292 (Ill. Sup. Ct., June 22, 1967), noted in 81 HARv. L. REv. 697 (1968), 
rev'd on rehearing, 39 Ill.2d 593, 237 N.E.2d 498 (1968). 
14. Despite a new Negro emphasis on racial separation, a national opinion survey 
recently showed that an overwhelming majority of blacks prefer integrated schooling 
for their children. NEWSWEEK, June 30, 1969, at 20. See also R. MACK, OUR CHILDREN'S 
BURDEN 455, 461 (1968). 
15. Brown v. Board of Educ., 347 U.S. 483 (1954); Bolling v. Sharpe, 347 U.S. 497 
(1954). 
16. Many of the familiar decisions invalidating classifications which deny benefits 
or impose burdens because of color will be noted only briefly, and tangential ques-
tions of standing to litigate and of the applicability of anti-discrimination statutes 
are omitted entirely. The latter points can affect the outcome of a given case, but 
they do not speak to the issue of state power. A glance at lower court litigation will 
show also that the standing requirement and the question whether corrective racial 
classifications conform to anti-discrimination laws have not forestalled decision on 
the constitutional merits. 
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for separatism by some Negroes, a result-motivated approach could 
answer at most the demands of this day only. But a "neutral" ap-
proach to the cases, it should be emphasized, is entirely compatible 
with a conscientious governmental response to the needs of black 
people and of disadvantaged members of other minorities. 
I. THE SCHOOL SEGREGATION CASES AND THEIR PROGENY 
One of the striking aspects of the school segregation controversy 
is that it produced opinions of extraordinary surface simplicity. In 
Brown v. Board of Education,17 for example, the Court took only 
ten pages to dispose of the most important question that had 
come before it in many years. Yet despite the simplicity of expres-
sion, or possibly because of it, there is widespread disagreement con-
cerning the effect of that case on the issues raised by fortuitous racial 
imbalance. Some ·writers have suggested that Brown prohibits official 
use of racial factors, while others argue that the decision requires 
affirmative state action, including classification by race, to eli~inate 
imbalance.18 It was perhaps inevitable that an opinion which could 
lend itself to such diverse interpretation would create uncertainty 
among those who control the schools and frustration among those 
who do not. 
Brown v. Board of Education was a consolidation of class actions 
brought on behalf of Negro minors who "had been denied admission 
to schools attended by white children under laws requiring or per-
mitting segregation according to race."19 In each case the lower court 
had applied the "separate but equal" rule of Plessy v. Ferguson,20 
which held constitutional guarantees to be satisfied if the races were 
provided substantially equal, though separate, facilities. On review, 
the Supreme Court, using language which some commentators be-
lieve to be applicable to de facto segregation, prefaced its treatment 
of Plessy with heavy emphasis on the importance of formal educa-
tion: 
In these days, it is doubtful that any child may reasonably be ex-
pected to succeed in life if he is denied the opportunity of an educa-
tion. Such an opportunity, where the state has undertaken to provide 
it, is a right which must be made available to all on equal terms.21 
17. 347 U.S. 483 (1954). 
18. Both views are considered in Bittker, s1ipra note 5. See also note 46, infra; 
Fiss, supra note 5; Kaplan, supra note 5. 
19. 347 U.S. 483, 488 (1954). 
20. 163 U.S. 537 (1896). 
21. 347 U.S. 483, 493 (1954). 
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The opinion then set out succinctly its basic rationale that segregated 
schools are inherently unequal and hence a denial of equal protec-
tion: 
To separate [Negro school children] ... from others of similar age 
and qualifications solely because of their race generates a feeling of 
inferiority as to their status in the community that may affect their 
hearts and minds in a way unlikely ever to be undone .... 
" ... The impact is greater when it has the sanction of the law; 
for the policy of separating the races is usually interpreted as denot-
ing the inferiority of the Negro group. A sense of inferiority affects 
the motivation of a child to learn. Segregation with the sanction of 
law, therefore, has a tendency to [retard] the educational and mental 
development of Negro children and to deprive them of some of the 
benefits they would receive in a racial[ly] integrated school system." 
... Any language in Plessy v. Ferguson contrary to this finding is 
rejected. 
We conclude that in the field of public education the doctrine 
of "separate but equal" has no place. Separate educational facilities 
are inherently unequal.22 
Bolling v. Sharpe,23 decided the same day, applied the Brown ration-
ale to the District of Columbia. Since the equal protection clause 
was inapplicable there, the Court relied on fifth amendment due 
process: 
Segregation in public education is not reasonably related to any 
proper governmental objective, and thus it imposes on Negro child-
ren of the District of Columbia a burden that constitutes an ar-
bitrary deprivation of their liberty in violation of the Due Process 
Clause.24 
Analysis of these cases should focus on three factors which 
might be thought to have controlled or contributed importantly to 
their outcome. One factor, stressed in Bolling but not in Brown, 
is the unreasonableness of the classification. If the School Segrega-
tion Cases stand for the proposition that race is an inherently arbi-
trary classification, state action employing racial criteria would seem 
to be invalid notwithstanding a purpose to alleviate imbalance. The 
other two elements, closely interrelated, are racial separation and 
the inherent inequality which separation was found to entail. If 
either state-imposed separation or inequality of educational oppor-
tunity was the decisive factor in Brown, the decision could require 
correction of imbalance arising out of the neighborhood school 
22. 347 U.S. at 494-95. 
23. 347 U.S. 497 (1954). 
24. 347 U.S. at 500. 
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policy.25 It is submitted that analysis of Brown and its progeny in 
these terms will reveal that the cases need not and should not be 
construed to prohibit racial classification for the purpose of reducing 
de facto segregation. But at the same time, those cases cannot be said 
to approve such classification. 
A. Racial Separation and Unequal Education 
It should be clear at the outset that the School Segregation Cases 
dealt specifically and exclusively with state-enforced segregation on 
the basis of race.26 That fact, which the opinions carefully stressed, 
is both elementary and crucial to an understanding of the scope of 
the decisions. The cases did not hold that children have a constitu-
tional right to attend an integrated school, although lower courts 
have sometimes extended them that far.27 Indeed, since Pierce v. So-
ciety of Sisters28 stated that laws requiring enrollment in public 
schools interfere unconstitutionally "with the liberty of parents and 
guardians to direct the upbringing and education of [their] chil-
dren,"29 Brown would seem to yield a principle of inclusion rather 
than a right to the joint presence of any particular group.30 Nor 
should the cases be read to proscribe fortuitous segregation resulting 
from racially neutral classifications such as the neighborhood school 
plan. Whatever the future may hold for that enigmatic issue, the 
25. Since these elements relate primarily to the issue of constitutional duty, they 
are discussed briefly and in the context of determining whether by indirection Brown 
gives an affirmative answer to questions of constitutional permissibility. 
26. Although the Court said in Brown that the adverse effects of segregation are 
" 'greater when it has the sanction of law,' " the opinion was silent as to whether 
any legal consequences attach to the "lesser" impact of unsanctioned segregation. 
Some language in Brown implies that it is the separation of the races that supports 
the finding of inequality that was fatal under the equal protection clause. But these 
references to separation were qualified by the phrase "solely because of their race" 
and so incorporate the element of racial classification. 
27. See Blocker v. Board of Educ., 226 F. Supp. 208 (E.D.N.Y. 1964). In Green v. 
County School Bd., 391 U.S. 430 (1968), which imposed an affirmative duty on de jure 
segregated schools to convert to a unitary system, the Court e.xpressly rejected an 
attempt to cast the issue in terms of whether the fourteenth amendment should be 
read "as universally requiring 'compulsory integration' •••• " 391 U.S. at 437. See 
notes 227-38, 262 infra and accompanying text concerning requirements for dis-
mantling dual school systems. 
28. 268 U.S. 510 (1925). 
29. 268 U.S. at 534-35. 
30. Some doubt has been cast on the vitality of Pierce by the steady decline of 
substantive due process concepts on which it was premised, although with respect to 
noneconomic liberties the decline may be more apparent than real. See Griswold v. 
Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 (1965), for an illustration of what can be regarded as "in-
corporation" of due process freedoms into the Bill of Rights. At any rate, most states 
would not make attendance in public schools mandatory, and the absence of such 
compulsion, together with the freedom of families to relocate, could render any right 
to attend integrated schools wholly illusory. 
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question simply was not presented in Brown, and the Court made 
no effort to reach it. This was implicit in the Court's request for 
amici curiae briefs from states "requiring or permitting racial dis-
crimination," a request which would have enlisted virtually every 
state in the country if the quoted phrase had comprehended de facto 
segregation. The restricted meaning of the decision was made ex-
plicit in the second Brown case,31 which advised lower courts, 
in fashioning remedies for de jure segregation, to "consider problems 
related to . . . revision of school districts and attendance areas into 
compact units to achieve a system of determining admission to the 
public schools on a nonracial basis . . . .''32 
I£ Brown did not address itself to racial separation in the ab-
stract, neither did it deal with abstract inequality. In fact, the Court 
has never held that the Constitution confers a right to share in the 
best academic facilities operated by the government. Such an un-
restrained guarantee would ignore the diverse nature of a state's 
educational needs and the limitation of resources that makes it neces-
sary to respond to those needs gradually. When Brown said that the 
opportunity of education "must be made available to all on equal 
terms," it could not have intended to foreclose temporary disparities 
or even long-term educational differences which, like special classes 
for the gifted or the underprivileged, are reasonably related to legit-
imate public interests.33 
However, the Brown case has been construed to afford a quali-
fied right to equal education. The thesis, as typically formulated, is 
that substantial differences in educational opportunity are imper-
missible except upon a showing of "adequate justification."34 This 
interpretation has the ironic effect of making the School Segregation 
Cases applicable to schools that are not segregated, either fortuitously 
31. Brown v. Board of Educ., 349 U.S. 294 (1955). 
32. 349 U.S. at 300-01 (emphasis added). Since segregated housing patterns were 
notorious long before 1955, the call for "compact" attendance zones clearly reveals 
the limited scope of Brown and Bolling. This limited scope is now favored by many 
blacks because neighborhood schools are suitable to community control. See notes 
299-301 infra and accompanying text. 
The "Brown case" as used herein refers to Brown I unless otherwise indicated. 
33. Every state operates academic programs to which access is limited, and many 
federal programs-including national defense loans, "G.I." benefits and aid to ele-
mentary and secondary schools-involve educational inequalities which have not been 
thought to be unconstitutional. Too often the effects of school policy fall dispropor-
tionately on Negroes and on others who are economically disadvantaged. In most state 
universities, for example, the disproportions begin, but do not end, with requirements 
for admission. 
34. Fiss, supra note 5; Horowitz, supra note 5; cf. Hobson v. Hansen, 269 F. Supp. 
401 (D.D.C. 1967), affd sub nom. Smuck v. Hobson, 408 F.2d 175 (D.C. Cir. 1969). 
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or by law, and to disparate treatment of members of the same race.311 
More recent decisions may suggest the invalidity of disparities based 
on inappropriate criteria, such as arbitrary geographical lines,36 but 
it is unnecessary for purposes of this Article to examine such issues 
in detail. Judicial endorsement of a qualified right to educational 
equality would, in any event, provide no clear support for corrective 
classification by race; it would mean only that in certain circum-
stances remedial action of some kind is obligatory. Such an undefined 
mandate is not at all incompatible with the principle of color-blind-
ness, a principle which might itself provide "adequate justification" 
for rejecting many proposed remedies.37 
B. Classification by Race 
The remammg question is whether racial classification is per-
missible under the School Segregation Cases. Most commentators 
35. The interpretation encounters other difficulties as well. First, the school cases 
state only that segregation by race, which had always been invalid when it resulted 
in substantially unequal treatment, is unconstitutional in the field of education be-
cause in that field "separate facilities are inherently unequal." Accordingly, the dis-
cussion of inequality need signify nothing more than that the condition on which 
Plessy v. Fergnson, 163 U.S. 537 (1896), upheld racial separation is unattainable. 
Second, if the invalidation of segregation in the schools implies a general right to 
educational equality, how is one to construe the per curiam decisions that followed 
Brown? See notes 42-45 infra. Would they not give rise to a right of equal op-
portunity to enjoy parks, beaches and transportation facilities? Conceivably, the in-
voluntariness of school attendance and Brown's emphasis on the importance of 
education might provide a basis for distinguishing. But see note 53 infra. Whether 
or not that is so, the proposed thesis would resurrect the equality test of the Plessy 
era. For a description of the sorry history of that test see Leflar and Davis, Segrega-
tion in the Public Schools-1953, 67 HARV. L. REV. 377, 392-402 (1954). While the new 
approach, unlike the old, would have a morally defensible objective, it would operate 
with the same unrefined tools for measuring equality and would introduce additional 
imponderables that bear on the question of justification. 
36. E.g., Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533 (1964). But see Mcinnis v. Shapiro, 293 F. 
Supp. 327 (N.D. lll. 1968), afj'd sub nom. Mcinnis v. Ogilvie, 394 U.S. 322 (1969). For 
a discussion of the equal education thesis see A. \VISE, RICH SCHOOLS, PooR SCHOOLS: 
THE PROMISE OF EQUAL EDUCATIONAL OPPORTUNITY (1968); for a critical view see 
Kurland, Equal Educational Opportunity: The Limits of Constitutional Jurisprudence 
Undefined, 35 U. Cm. L. REv. 583 (1968). 
37. Because of its imprecision, or what some may regard as "creative ambiguity," 
the Brown opinion is susceptible to highly simplistic expansion. It is easy, if one is 
willing to drive single-mindedly over stubborn obstacles, to construct a syllogism 
which embodies a desired result. For example, the neighborhood school policy could 
be toppled this way: 
Educational inequalities based on geography are unconstitutional; neighborhood 
schools cannot be equal because they draw students of uneven motivation and 
preparation; therefore, states must abandon the neighborhood system. 
The unitary school concept of Green v. County School Bd., 391 U.S. 430 (1968), could 
be put to similar use: 
Because of past discrimination southern schools cannot employ otherwise valid 
plans that fail to achieve integration; de facto segregation is in part a product 
of official discrimination in housing; therefore, northern states must liquidate 
the effects of their discriminatory practices by integrating the schools. 
These oversimplified illustrations underscore the need (I) to observe carefully what 
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agree that the decisions did not foreclose such classifi.cation.38 The 
opinions were limited in terms to education, and the explicit reason 
for not applying Plessy was that separate facilities were seen as in-
herently unequal in that field. If Brown had imposed a general 
ban on racial lines, Plessy would have been obliterated rather than 
"out of place," and the discussion of separation and inequality which 
comprised much of the opinion would have been wholly gratuitous. 
The fact that the cases were argued on the theory of a constitutional. 
color-bar30 serves to underline the Court's familiarity ·with that ap-
proach and its choice of another rationale.40 
But a more serious threat to the validity of corrective racial classi-
fication is presented when the school cases are interpreted in con-
junction with the per curiam rulings which followed them. Although 
Brown had concluded only that "in the field of public education 
the doctrine of 'separate but equal' has no place,"41 per curiam deci-
sions soon struck dmm segregation in public parks,42 busses,43 golf 
courses,44 and beaches.45 Because racial distinctions were common to 
all the cases and because there was little evidence of inherent in-
equality in those cases decided per curiam, some ·writers have sug-
gested that Brown and its progeny may prohibit all governmental 
classification by race.46 Despite this impressive support, it is sub-
mitted that such an interpretation is not desirable, was probably not 
contemplated, and is certainly not required. 
The first of the relevant per curiam decisions was handed down 
early in the 1955 Term.47 The Court, citing no authority, affirmed 
a judgment invalidating state-enforced segregation of public beaches 
and bathhouses. Other per curiam holdings to the same effect came 
quickly.48 Each of the cases raised an issue of state power to exclude 
the School Segregation Cases specifically decided, (2) to assign proper weight to com-
peting values in determining where the decisions should lead us in the future, and 
(3) not to confuse points (1) and (2). 
38. See L. HAND, THE BILL OF RIGHTS 54-55 (1958); Wechsler, Toward Neutral 
Principles of Co11stit11tio11al Law, 73 HARV. L. REv. I (1959). 
39. See report of oral argument in 21 U.S.L.W. 3163 (Dec. 16, 1952); 22 U.S.L.W. 
3157 (Dec. 15, 1953). 
40. It is significant that Bolling v. Sharpe, 347 U.S. 497 (1954), characterized racial 
classifications as "suspect" but avoided the further step of holding them unconstitu-
tional per se. 
41. 347 U.S. 483, 495 (1954). 
42. New Orleans City Park Improvement Assn. v. Detiege, 358 U.S. 54 (1958). 
43. Gayle v. Browder, 352 U.S. 903 (1956). 
44. Holmes v. City of Atlanta, 350 U.S. 879 (1955). 
45. Mayor of Baltimore v. Dawson, 350 U.S. 877 (1955). 
46. P. KAUPER, FRONTIERS OF CONSTITUTIONAL LmERTY 219 (1956) ("no classification 
based on race or color can be accepted'); "Wechsler, SllfJra note 38, at 32. 
47. Mayor of Baltimore v. Dawson, 350 U.S. 877 (1955). 
48. See notes 42-44 supra. 
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Negroes from public facilities on racial grounds when allegedly equal 
facilities were available to them. Important and comprehensive as 
the question was, it surely did not call for a ruling as to whether 
official classification by race is inevitably unconstitutional in every 
context, without regard to its purpose or effect. And if the Court 
meant to embrace that far-reaching proposition, the vehicle of per 
curiam decision would seem a singularly inappropriate way to an-
nounce it. 
The impression that the per curiam cases prohibit all racial 
classification rests largely on the view that those cases, in supposed 
contrast to Brown, were devoid of evidence of inherent inequality. 
Yet if there was little evidence that separate golf courses and similar 
separate facilities were incapable of equalization, there was even 
less support for the expansive notion that race is always unre-
lated to legitimate public objectives, or that such a relationship 
is necessarily irrelevant. More moderate approaches to the issue 
of segregated facilities were certainly available. The Brown case 
would clearly control some situations, such as attempts to restrict 
black students to the rear of a public school bus or to segregate 
them at school-sponsored athletic events.49 Public playgrounds, too, 
though dissociated from the schools, might properly fall within the 
same rule since Brown relied on the "deleterious effects [ of segre-
gation] upon the colored children in implying their inferiority"50-
effects which can be stimulated outside the classroom as well 
as within it. When facilities are ordinarily used exclusively by 
adults, the analogy to Brown is less compelling, but even in those 
instances the rationale of Bolling v. Sharpe remains persuasive. For 
if segregation in the schools "is not reasonably related to any proper 
governmental objective,"51 it is difficult to see what legitimate pur-
pose could be promoted by segregating other public facilities. School 
segregation implies an inferior status for Negro children, but "is it 
not equally relevant to suggest that Negroes may properly regard all 
segregation legislation as an expression of racial superiority by 
the white race?"52 It seems that the implications of Brown and 
Bolling were bound to radiate beyond the schools and that a court 
49. Cf. McLaurin v. Oklahoma State Regents, 339 U.S. 637 (1950), which applied 
the separate but equal doctrine to strike down official segregation in a university 
cafeteria and other school-related facilities. 
50. Wechsler, supra note 38, at 32. 
51. 347 U.S. 497, 500 (1954). The Court's implicit assumption that the associa-
tional preference of the white majority is not a legitimate public concern was force-
fully challenged by Wechsler, supra note 38. But see Black, The Lawfulness of the 
Segregation Decisions, 69 YALE L.J. 421 (1960); Pollak, Racial Discrimination and 
Judicial Integrity: A Reply to Professor Wechsler, 108 U. PA. L. REv. 1 (1959). 
52. P. K.AUPER, supra note 46, at 218. 
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committed to those cases could scarcely avoid the results announced 
per curiam.153 If that is so, there is little reason to read into the deci-
sions an intention to outlaw all uses of racial criteria. Rather, the 
scope of the issues actually presented in the cases, the alternative 
grounds on which those issues could be met, and the per curiam 
disposition54 suggest a more modest rationale. All of the cases in-
volved segregation by race at the behest of the politically dominant 
group, and none called for the adjudication of any other issue. Ac-
cordingly, the per curiam decisions should be interpreted together 
with the school cases as prohibiting official segregation of public fa-
cilities by racial classification directed against the minority class. 
This construction leaves open both the question of segregation based 
on other criteria and the question of purposeful integration by racial 
classification. 1515 
II. THE JAPANESE RELOCATION CASES 
The mass evacuation and detention of Japanese-Americans during 
World War II constitutes the most repressive discrimination program 
53. Attempts to distinguish between education and other state functions have 
been at best partially successful. The view that noneducational activities are susceptible 
to equalization without integration has failed to take account of the potential 
psychological damage of segregation outside the schools. The voluntary nature of 
these activities is also inconclusive since that feature dilutes the associational claims 
of the majority as well as those of the minority. Moreover, the importance of educa-
tion, so much stressed in Brown, is not unique; housing, domestic relations, and 
hospital care, each of which has been the subject of segregation laws, also serve 
important human needs. Finally, the right to equal treatment has never been con-
fined to "fundamental" freedoms. See, e.g., Rinaldi v. Yeager, 384 U.S. 305 (1966). It 
is fair to say, all things considered, that the distinction between educational and 
other facilities was destined for an early demise. See Muir v. Louisville Park Theatrical 
Assn., 347 U.S. 971 (1954), in which, one week after Brown, a dispute over segregated 
recreational facilities was remanded "for consideration in the light of the Segregation 
Cases • . • and conditions that now prevail." 
54. There is no doubt that the per curiam device has been misused on other oc-
casions and little doubt that in the segregation Cases it would have been advisable 
to prepare at least one opinion to bridge the gap between educational and recreational 
facilities. See generally Brown, Foreword: Process of Law, The Supreme Court 1957 Term, 
72 HARV. L. REY. 77 (1958). Nevertheless, an expansive interpretation of per curiam 
results should not be favored without convincing supportive evidence. 
55. Recent cases implementing Brown seem consistent with this analysis. For 
example, Goss v. Board of Educ., 373 U.S. 683 (1963), struck down a transfer plan 
which permitted students assigned to new schools, at which they were a racial 
minority, to return to their former schools in which they would constitute a ma-
jority. The Court emphasized that these racial cl~fications were productive of 
segregation: "The transfer plans being based solely on racial factors which, under 
their terms, inevitably lead toward segregation of the students by race, we conclude 
that they run counter to the admonition of Brown v. Board of Education, 349 U.S. 
294 •••• " 373 U.S. at 684-85. Compare Monroe v. Board of Commrs., 391 U.S. 450 
(1968) and Green v. County School Bd., 391 U.S. 430 (1968) (free choice plans pur-
posefully achieving minimal disruption to dual school system held invalid), with 
Alabama State Teachers Assn. v. Alabama Pub. School &: College Authority, 289 F. 
Supp. 784 (M.D. Ala. 1968), affd per curiam, 393 U.S. 400 (1969) (traditional free choice 
policy at the college level upheld as consistent with a unitary school plan). 
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undertaken by the federal government in modern times. Those 
measures deserve careful consideration since they probably mark, if 
they do not exceed, the outer limits of governmental power to classify 
racially.56 The pertinent aspects of the program began on February 
19, 1942, when President Roosevelt issued an executive order au-
thorizing the Department of War to prescribe military areas "in such 
places and of such extent" as it might choose, from which "any or all 
persons" could be excluded or subjected to any restrictions.57 
Armed with that sweeping authority, General De Witt, the military 
commander for the west coast states, issued a series of directives which 
culminated in the exclusion of more than 100,000 persons of Japa-
nese· descent from California, southern Arizona, and western Wash-
ington and Oregon, territory which he labeled Military Area No. I. 
First, an 8:00 P.M. curfew was imposed on enemy aliens and all per-
sons of Japanese ancestry in regions of the Pacific coast which in-
cluded the metropolitan centers where those groups were heavily 
concentrated. Then he issued orders prohibiting Japanese-Americans 
from leaving Military Area No. I and confining them to centers 
where they were processed for evacuation and, usually, prolonged 
detention. In March, Congress strengthened the hand of the Execu-
tive by enacting a statute which made it a misdemeanor knowingly 
to violate restrictions imposed by a military commander in a mili-
tary area. 58 
General DeWitt's curfew order was brought before the Supreme 
Court in Hirabayashi v. United States.59 The appellant, an American 
citizen of Japanese ancestry and a student at the University of "Wash-
ington, had been convicted on nvo counts of violating the federal 
statute by failing to report for pre-evacuation proceedings and by 
remaining away from home after 8:00 P.M. Since the sentences on 
those counts were to run concurrently, the Court considered the 
validity of the curfew only. Hirabayashi's principal contention was 
that the due process clause of the fifth amendment prohibited the 
differential treatment of persons of Japanese descent. Speaking 
through Mr. Chief Justice Stone, the Court unanimously rejected 
that contention: 
56. See generally J. TENBROEK, E. BARNHART 8: F. MATSON, PREJUDICE, '\'/AR AND THE 
CONSTITUTION (1954); Dembitz, Racial Discrimination and the Military Judgment: The 
Supreme Court's Korematsu and Endo Decisions, 45 CoLUM. L. REv. 175 (1945); 
Rostow, The Japanese American Cases-A Disaster, 54 YALE L.J. 489 (1945); Comment, 
Alien Enemies and Japanese-Americans: A Problem of Wartime Controls, 51 YALE 
L.J. 1316 (1942). 
57. Exec. Order No. 9,066, 3 C.F.R. 1092, 1093 (1938-1943 Comp.). 
58. Act of March 21, 1942, ch. 191, 56 Stat. 173. 
59. 320 U.S. 81 (1943). 
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Because racial discriminations are in most circumstances irrelevant 
and therefore prohibited, it by no means follows that, in dealing 
·with the perils of war, Congress and the Executive are wholly pre-
cluded from taking into account those facts and circumstances which 
are relevant to measures for our national defense and for the suc-
cessful prosecution of the war, and which may in fact place citizens 
of one ancestry in a different category from others. . . . The adop-
tion by Government, in the crisis of war and of threatened invasion, 
of measures for the public safety based upon the recognition of facts 
and circumstances which indicate that a group of one national ex-
traction may menace that safety more than others, is not wholly be-
yond the limits of the Constitution and is not to be condemned 
merely because in other and in most circumstances racial distinctions 
are irrelevant.oo 
The circumstances which saved the classification were (1) that the 
West Coast was peculiarly vulnerable to invasion or sabotage because 
of its proximity to Japan and because of its concentration of military 
and industrial facilities, (2) that previous discrimination against the 
Japanese had impeded their assimilation and encouraged continued 
attachment to Japanese institutions, and (3) that there were known to 
be disloyal elements in the Japanese community which could not 
readily be identified and isolated. 
vVe cannot say that these facts and circumstances, considered in the 
particular war setting, could afford no ground for differentiating 
citizens of Japanese ancestry from other groups in the United States. 
The fact alone that attack on our shores was threatened by Japan 
rather than another enemy power set these citizens apart from others 
who have no particular associations with Japan.61 
Although the Chief Justice's guarded opinion avoided any de-
cision on evacuation, it nevertheless became the basis for sustaining 
the exclusionary power when the evacuation issue was presented in 
Korematsu v. United States.62 In the latter case, the Court, by a six-to-
three majority, upheld the conviction of an American citizen of 
Japanese descent who had been found in Military Area No. 1 in 
violation of official orders, but whose personal loyalty was not ques-
tioned. It acknowledged that the exclusion restricted the civil rights 
of a single racial group and therefore was constitutionally "suspect," 
but stressed that the order was based on public necessity and not on 
racial antagonism: 
To cast this case into outlines of racial prejudice, without reference 
60. 320 U.S. at 100-01. 
61. 320 U.S. at 101. 
62. 323 U.S. 214 (1944). 
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to the real military dangers which were presented, merely confuses 
the issue. Korematsu was not excluded from the Military Area be-
cause of hostility to him or his race. He was excluded because we are 
at war with the Japanese Empire, because the properly constituted 
military authorities feared an invasion of our West Coast and felt 
constrained to take proper security measures, because they decided 
that the military urgency of the situation demanded that all citizens 
of Japanese ancestry be segregated from the West Coast temporarily, 
and finally, because Congress reposing its confidence in this time 
of war in our military leaders-as inevitably it must-determined 
that they should have the power to do just this. There was evidence 
of disloyalty on the part of some, the military authorities considered 
that the need for action was great, and time was short. We cannot-
by availing ourselves of the calm perspective of hindsight-now say 
that at that time these actions were unjustified.63 
The Relocation Cases plainly support the view that racially dif-
ferentiated governmental action is permissible in some circum-
stances. 64 According to those opinions, racial distinctions are "not 
wholly beyond the limits of the Constitution"65 and may be justified 
by "pressing public necessity.''66 Yet the Relocation Cases have al-
most invariably been used to strike dO"wn, rather than to allow, official 
classification by race. 67 The inevitable question, therefore, is whether 
those decisions have current vitality insofar as they permitted dif-
ferential treatment of Japanese-Americans in the context of war. 
For purposes of this Article that is the only issue, of the many raised 
by the evacuation, which requires discussion. On this issue it seems 
likely that, despite the odiousness of racial disabilities, the Court 
would adhere to the Relocation Cases in comparable circumstances 
of wartime emergency.68 
63. 323 U.S. at 223-24 (emphasis omitted). Justices Roberts, Murphy, and Jackson 
dissented but did not dispute the government's power to differentiate between 
Japanese-Americans and other persons, a power which each of them had voted to 
sustain in Hirabayashi. 
64. Although the racial lines of the evacuation program were drawn in terms of 
ancestry rather than color, the Court regarded "race" as the classifying trait and 
attached no importance to that distinction. Some commentators, noting that Ameri• 
cans "having an ethnic affinity with our Asiatic enemy" were treated differently from 
those having an affinity "with our white European enemies," have equated the 
Japanese-American classification with differentiation by color. J. TENBROEK, E. BARN-
HART &: F. MATSON, supra note 56, at 384 n.3. 
65. Hirabayashi v. United States, 320 U.S. 81, 101 (1943). 
66. Korematsu v. United States, 323 U.S. 214, 216 (1944). 
67. The technique has been to leave the cases undisturbed but to cite them for 
the proposition that racial classifications are suspect. E.g., McLaughlin v. Florida, 379 
U.S. 184, 192 (1964). 
68. The fact that members of the Court who were thoroughly committed to the 
protection of civil liberties unanimously sustained the classification-as distinguished 
from the use to which that classification was put in Korematsu-is more revealing 
than views expressed "from the vantage point of ••. tranquil times." "\Van-en, The 
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The most instructive, if uninspiring, cases on this question are 
those dealing with the constitutional rights of enemy aliens.69 It has 
long been settled that the fifth and fourteenth amendments protect 
resident aliens,70 and generally the outbreak of war has had little 
impact on the legal position of nationals of friendly countries.71 But 
drastically different rules apply to the citizen of a nation at war with 
the United States. The Supreme Court has clearly stated that the 
federal government may seize his property without payment of com-
pensation.72 In addition, the enemy alien "is constitutionally sub-
ject to summary arrest, internment and deportation whenever a 
'declared war' exists. Courts will entertain his plea for freedom from 
Executive custody only to ascertain the existence of a state of war 
and whether he is an alien enemy and so subject to the Alien 
Enemy Act."73 These rules apply irrespective of the individual's 
personal loyalty to the United States and have been explained on 
the theory that the exercise of basic freedoms by an enemy alien 
would redound to the advantage of the enemy nation: 
The enemy alien is bound by an allegiance which commits him to 
lose no opportunity to forward the cause of our enemy; hence the 
United States, assuming him to be faithful to his allegiance, regards 
him as part of the enemy resources. It therefore takes measures to 
disable him from commission of hostile acts imputed as his inten-
tion because they are a duty to his sovereign.74 
There was thus strong precedent for the differential treatment 
Bill of Rights and the Military, in THE GREAT RIGHTS IOI (E. Cahn ed. 1963). Al-
though these cases were decided before Bolling v. Sharpe, the Court considered the 
issues of inequality through the due process clause, as Bolling was to do some years 
later. 
69. "In the primary meaning of the words .•. an alien enemy is the subject of a 
foreign state at war with the United States." Techt v. Hughes, 229 N.Y. 222, 229, 128 
N.E. 185, 186 (1920) Qudge Cardozo), quoted with approval in Johnson v. Eisen-
trager, 339 U.S. 763, 769 n.2 (1950). This is the meaning of the term as used in the 
Alien Enemy Act, which provides that "natives, citizens, denizens, or subjects" of a 
hostile nation "shall be liable to be apprehended, restrained, secured and removed" 
on order of the President. 50 U.S.C. § 21 (1964). Congress has sometimes explicitly 
limited the meaning of the term in statutes affecting property rights. See Guessefeldt 
v. McGrath, 342 U.S. 308 (1952). 
70. Yick Wo v. Hopkins, 118 U.S. 356 (1886). 
71. Puttkammer, Alien Enemies and Alien Friends, in WAR AND THE LAw 38, 49 
(E. Puttkammer ed. 1944). 
72. Silesian-American Corp. v. Clark, 332 U.S. 469, 475 (1947); Cummings v. 
Deutsche Bank, 300 U.S. 115, 120 (1937); Brown v. United States, 12 U.S. (8 Cranch) 
109, 121 (1814) (Chief Justice Marshall). But cf. Guessefeldt v. McGrath, 342 U.S. 308, 
317-19 (1952). The right of friendly aliens to receive compensation was settled by 
Russian Volunteer Fleet v. United States, 282 U.S. 481 (1931). 
73. Johnson v. Eisentrager, 339 U.S. 763, 775 (1950). 
74. 339 U.S. at 772-73. 
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of Japanese, German, and Italian aliens during the war.76 The critical 
challenges to the classification of the Relocation Cases were that it 
(I) included not only Japanese nationals but also their descendants, 
and (2) did not include descendants of German and Italian nationals. 
The first was, to be sure, a significant step. Yet if Japanese aliens 
were subject to internment and deportation without a hearing solely 
because of their nationality, it would be difficult to show that Japa-
nese-Americans who were born in the United States must remain 
totally immune to all differential treatment based on ancestry. Such 
radical differences in liability do not appear to have been justified 
by any known differences in the personality of the two groups. It 
was considered "naive" in the circumstances of the war to assume 
"that actual loyalties within the family corresponded to this rigid 
dichotomy"76 between the Japanese alien and the United States 
citizen of Japanese descent. And while a plausible argument can be 
made that nationality is a more suitable classifying trait for a security 
program than ancestry, the distinction between the two types of classi-
fication is often subtle.77 Both classifications are grossly overinclusive 
and are defensible, if at all, only because of the emergency produced 
by a declared war. Perhaps certain restrictions applicable to enemy 
nationals should be inapplicable to enemy descendants. But if differ-
ences in nationality warrant the severe restraints authorized by the 
75. The Alien Enemy Act was adopted by Congress in 1798 and has remained in 
effect with minor modifications in language. During both world wars enemy aliens 
were interned and enemy .property seized. See Comment, supra note 56, at 1318. The 
statute was held to be valid in Ludecke v. Watkins, 335 U.S. 160 (1948), in which a 
German national was deported on order of the Attorney General after internment 
during the war. To the same effect, see the many lower court cases collected in the 
Ludecke opinion. 335 U.S. at 165 n.8. Ludecke did not suggest as lower courts some-
times had, that enemy aliens are not entitled to due process protection, a view which 
would be at odds with the settled rule that enemy- aliens are "persons" within the 
meaning of the fifth amendment. Wong Wing v. United States, 163 U.S. 228 (1896). 
76. Fairman, The Law of Martial Rule, 55 HARV. L. REV. 1253, 1302 (1942). In the 
case of Japanese-Americans, the source of the dichotomy also commended its de-
emphasis. Children of Japanese immigrants had become American citizens by birth; 
the immigrants themselves were disqualified by statute, because of race and color, 
from eligibility for naturalization. See notes 112-16 infra and accompanying text. 
Distinctions like these, one may say without disrespect for citizenship, provide a 
dubious basis for allocating fundamental rights. 
77. Nationality, like ancestry, may be inherited and frequently has no relation to 
personal loyalties. Under the rule of jus sanguinis, which is widely followed, a child 
wherever born acquires the nationality of his father. 2 C. HYDE, INTERNATIONAL LAW, 
1073-78 (2d ed. 1945). Thus consanguinity may determine enemy status under either 
classification. Of course, ancestry cannot be voluntarily relinquished, as nationality 
sometimes can. But the validity of classification by national origin has not turned on 
whether or not aliens could or did renounce their foreigu nationality. The Alien Enemy 
Act applies, for example, to "natives" of a hostile power, meaning those born in 
the enemy country, even though the status in question is involuntary and un-
alterable. United States ex rel. D'Esquiva v. Uhl, 137 F.2d 903 (2d Cir. 1943). 
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Alien Enemy Act, it is hard to deny that differences in ancestry may 
support at least some differential treatment. 
The use of ancestry, rather than nationality, as a classifying 
trait can be better appraised when the alien enemy law is stripped of 
the fiction that nationals of hostile powers are bound to aid the 
enemy.78 The notion that a resident alien has a legal duty to act il-
legally, notwithstanding his own sentiments to the contrary, is bad 
law and bad social psychology.79 The real reason for upholding the 
enemy alien classification is not that personal commitments are ir-
relevant but that they are difficult to discern; and the reason for 
focusing attention on the class is that personal affiliation with an 
enemy nation is believed to enhance the potential for disloyal action. 
Affiliations of this kind cut across the lines of citizenship, however, 
and the suspicions which they generate probably have essentially the 
same foundations in the case of enemy descendants as in the case of 
enemy aliens. so Viewed from this perspective, the crucial issue is 
not so much whether the government classifies by nationality or by 
ancestry, but whether, under either classification, adequate oppor-
tunities are assured for individual adjudication and whether any 
burdens temporarily imposed are narrowly circumscribed.81 
78. Just why a resident alien should be conclusively presumed to give actual 
allegiance to the country from which he emigrated has never been made clear. In 
Great Britain the presumption led to the internment of Jewish refugees, apparently 
on the theory that they were in the country to do Hitler's bidding. See Cohn, Legal 
Aspects of Internment, 4 Moo. L. REv. 200 (1941). 
79. See Rostow, supra note 56, at 519-20. 
80. Reliable scientific evidence concerning the probable conduct of either class is 
scarce. Furthermore, since the principal internal danger during war is usually sporadic 
sabotage or espionage rather than mass disaffection, generalizations about group 
behavior have questionable value. It can be argued, on the other hand, that classifica-
tion by ancestry and nationality should both be abandoned. However, courts have 
shown no inclination to protect enemy nationals in the face of wartime demands, 
and even Justices who favor substantial protection contend that "[t]he needs of the 
hour may well require summary apprehension and detention of alien enemies." 
Ludecke v. Watkins, 335 U.S. 160, 187 (1948) Gustice Douglas, dissenting). 
81. There was widespread agreement during the war that the distinction between 
citizens and aliens should be rejected and that individual determinations of loyalty 
should be made at the earliest opportunity. There was also wide agreement that an 
overinclusive classification of suspects, drawn in terms of group affiliations, was neces-
sary in order to disarm the few members of each group who presented a real threat 
and who could not be easily identified. See, e.g., Rheinstein, The Armed Forces and 
the Civilian Population, in WAR AND THE LAw 58 (E. Puttkammer ed. 1944); Com-
ment, supra note 56. The evidence concerning ~e extent of the threat has been 
extensively debated, but outspoken critics of the evacuation have conceded that in 
certain situations "some preventive action was imperative." J. TENBROEK, E. BARNHART 
&: F. MATSON, supra note 56, at 284. Given the difficulty of distinguishing between 
real and apparent internal dangers, many observers felt that some differential action 
could have been devised, pending further investigation, which would have protected 
the national security and still avoided the repressive measures imposed upon Japanese-
Americans. 
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The second ground for challenging the classification of the evac-
uation program was that it did not extend to German and Italian 
descendants and hence was underinclusive. Because exemptions of 
this type are less offensive than overinclusive ones, which reach inno-
cent persons who happen to share circumstances with the blame-
worthy, they are said to be permissible if supported by "fair reason."82 
The justification offered by the War Department for exempting Ger-
man and Italian descendants was that those groups were less danger-
ous than Japanese-Americans and that deployment of forces to deal 
with them would greatly "overtax our strength."83 It was argued too 
that the inclusion of German and Italian descendants could prej-
udice loyal Japanese-Americans by delaying individualized treat-
ment, 84 and finally that "the fact alone that attack on our shores was 
threatened by Japan rather than by another enemy power set 
Uapanese-American] citizens apart from others who have no partic-
ular association with Japan."85These considerations may have con-
cealed the real motives for the evacuation, but they would probably 
constitute "fair reason" for an exemption from some kinds of differ-
ential action. 
The foregoing analysis in no way implies the general viability of 
the Relocation Cases. Those cases have properly been condemned for 
permitting the imposition of highly obnoxious restraints on a long 
term basis, for dispensing with vital safeguards of procedural due 
process, and for relaxing judicial control over the military to an un-
precedented level. What these excesses show, however, is not the un-
constitutionality of the Japanese-American classification but an out-
rageous use of that classification.86 It does not follow, of course, that 
because the government was allowed to classify racially during the 
emergency of total war, it may do so in the completely different con-
text of the public schools. The significance of the Relocation Cases 
lies mainly in demonstrating that even racial lines which purpose-
fully burden a minority race have not been held unconstitutional 
82. Tussman & tenBroek, The Equal Protection of the Laws, 37 CALIF. L. REV. 
341, 348-51 (1949). But cf. McLaughlin v. Florida, 379 U.S. 184 (1964). 
83. Quoted in J. TENBROEK, E. BARNHART & F. MATSON, supra note 56, at 303. 
84. Cf. Ex parte Endo, 323 U.S. 283 (1944) (holding post-evacuation detention of 
loyal Japanese to be unauthorized). 
85. Hirabayashi v. United States, 320 U.S. 81, 101 (1943). 
86. As previously noted, the Supreme Court was unanimous in upholding the 
classification; disagreement centered on the nature of the disabilities which could be 
imposed. That such overinclusiveness need not produce harsh results was illustrated 
by the experience of alien hearing boards which conducted investigations "with a 
minimal interference with the standards of justice in the community" and which 
offered recommendations which prompted the parole or release of many enemy aliens 
arrested on suspicion. Rostow, supra note 56, at 493. 
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per se. Insofar as corrective racial classification in the schools may 
disadvantage one group or another,87 this limited proposition seems a 
necessary, though insufficient, predicate for such classification. 
III. RACIAL DISCRIMINATION AGAINST ALIENS 
The war relocation program was not the first occasion for legiti-
mating federal discrimination by race. In other areas, notably im-
migration and naturalization, the Court has declared Congressional 
power to be "plenary" so that racial classification is apparently not 
foreclosed. 88 
A. Immigration and Deportation 
Immigration quotas, which were intended to preserve a desired 
racial balance in the population of the United States,89 present an 
especially close analogy to the problem of de facto segregation. The 
Chinese Exclusion Case00 is the logical starting point for discussion. 
In that case a Chinese alien who had lived in San Francisco for twelve 
years was denied re-entry to the United States following a brief visit 
to China. Before the trip he had been issued a certificate of re-entry 
pursuant to a federal law which suspended new immigration of Chi-
nese laborers but exempted resident aliens who journeyed abroad.91 
Upon presenting the certificate, he was refused admission because a 
statute enacted during his return cruise voided all outstanding cer-
tificates and prohibited the re-entry of former resident Chinese labor-
ers. 92 In the Supreme Court he contended that the statute deprived 
him of liberty without due process of law. 
Mr. Justice Field, writing for a unanimous Court, upheld the 
statute and stated that the power to regulate immigration was an in-
herent incident of sovereignty and that no vested rights could be 
conferred by the certificate. He emphasized the "non-assimilability" 
of Chinese aliens and the fears which they had evoked. 
[T]hey remained strangers in the land, residing apart by themselves, 
87. See notes 266-78 infra and accompanying text. 
88. See generally C. GORDON &: H. ROSENFIELD, IMMIGRATION LAW AND PROCEDURE 
(rev. ed. 1967): M. KONVITZ, THE ALIEN AND THE ASIATIC JN AMERICAN LAW (1946); 
Boudin, The Settler Within Our Gates, 26 N.Y.U. L. REv. 266 (1951); Hesse, The 
Constitutional Status of the Lawfully Admitted Permanent Resident Alien: The 
Pre-1917 Cases, 68 YALE L.J. 1578 (1959); Developments in the Law-Immigration and 
Nationality, 66 HARv. L. REv. 643 (1953); Comment, The Alien and the Constitution, 
20 U. Cm. L. REv. 547 (1953). 
89. C. GORDON &: H. ROSENFIELD, supra note 88, at 2-29. 
90. Chae Chan Ping v. United States, 130 U.S. 581 (1889). 
91. Act of May 6, 1882, ch. 126, § 4, 22 Stat. 58, as amended, Act of July 5, 1884, 
ch. 220, 23 Stat. 115. 
92. Act of Oct. I, 1888, ch. 1064, 25 Stat. 504. 
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and adhering to the customs and usages of their own country. It 
seemed impossible for them to assimilate with our people or to make 
any change in their habits or modes of living. As they grew in num-
ber each year the people of the coast saw, or believed they saw ... 
great danger that at no distant day that portion of our country 
would be overrun by them unless prompt action was taken to restrict 
their immigration.93 
The opinion then asserted that it was the nation's "highest duty" 
to provide security from foreign aggression. 
It matters not in what form such aggression and encroachment come, 
whether from the foreign nation acting in its national character or 
from vast hordes of its people crowding in upon us. The government, 
possessing the powers which are to be exercised for protection and 
security, is clothed with authority to determine the occasion on which 
the powers shall be called forth; and its determination, so far as the 
subjects affected are concerned, are [sic] necessarily conclusive upon 
all its departments and officers. If, therefore, the government of the 
United States, through its legislative department, considers the pres-
ence of foreigners of a different race in this country, who ·will not 
assimilate with us, to be dangerous to its peace and security, their 
exclusion is not to be stayed because at the time there are no actual 
hostilities with the nation of which the foreigners are subjects .... 
[I]ts determination is conclusive upon the judiciary.94 
The Court's vague references to nonassimilability, national security, 
unreviewability, and incidents of sovereignty left the rationale of the 
case in considerable doubt, but the power to exclude aliens on the 
basis of race was acknowledged unequivocally.95 
In contrast to immigration practices, the authority to deport 
aliens has generally not been exerted along racial lines. However, 
Fong Yue Ting v. United States,96 decided shortly after the exclu-
sionary power had been sustained, dealt with a situation that approxi-
mated expulsion on the ground of race.97 In Fong deportation 
proceedings were brought against Chinese aliens who did not possess 
certificates of residence, as required by federal law. A statute pro-
93. 130 U.S. 581, 595 (1889). 
94. 130 U.S. at 606. 
95. That power was exercised against Asiatic groups in 1917 and against persons 
ineligible for citizenship in 1924. M. KoNVITz, supra note 88, at 22·28. The power 
was reinforced by dicta broadly asserting that "No limits can be put by the courts 
upon the power of Congress to protect [against] ••• the advent of aliens whose race 
or habits render them undesirable as citizens •••• " '\Vong Wing v. United States, 
163 U.S. 228, 237 (1896). 
96. 149 U.S. 698 (1893). 
97. In subsequent cases, the authority to expel aliens, like the authority to 
exclude them, has been reasserted in broad terms. See, e.g., Ng Fung Ho v. White, 
259 U.S. 276, 280 (1921), stating that "Congress has power to order at any time the 
deportation of aliens whose presence in the country it deems hurtful • • • ." 
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vided that all resident Chinese laborers must apply for such certif-
icates and that those failing to do so would be deemed to have entered 
the country unlawfully.98 Deportation was mandatory unless the alien 
could show that he had been prevented by unavoidable cause from 
complying with the statute and could prove by a "white" witness that 
he was a resident at the time the statute was enacted. 
Mr. Justice Gray stated for a six-to-three majority that the Court 
should not "undertake to pass upon political questions, the final 
decision of which has been committed by the Constitution to other 
departments of the government.''99 Reasoning from that admonition, 
he found that the power to expel residents was no less sweeping than 
the authority to exclude nonresidents: "The right of the nation to 
expel or deport foreigners who have not been naturalized or taken 
any steps toward becoming citizens of the country, rests upon the 
same grounds, and is as absolute and unqualified as the right to pro-
hibit and prevent_ their entrance into the country."100 The further 
requirement that residence be proved by the testimony of white wit-
nesses was regarded as a legislatively prescribed rule of evidence and 
was upheld by analogy to naturalization provisions, which required 
certain proofs by the testimony of citizens rather than of aliens.101 
The relevance of the alien exclusion cases to current questions 
of racial classification depends initially upon the rationale of the 
decisions. At least four interpretations are possible: (I) that consti-
tutional limitations do not apply to immigration; (2) that non-
resident aliens have no standing to press these claims; (3) that the 
question of who shall be admitted to the United States is inap-
propriate for judicial review; and (4) that constitutional limitations 
are applicable but were not transgressed. Each of those explana-
tions is consistent with the plain import of the cases that Congress 
may discriminate by race in fixing the national immigration policy. 
The first three interpretations, however, whatever their merit, could 
have no bearing on the problem of racial imbalance in the schools. 
With respect to the fourth, a strong argument has been made that the 
Chinese Exclusion Case must have been predicated on the non-
assimilability of Chinese aliens, since any other rationale would re-
duce the discussion of that factor to irrelevance. 
98. Act of May 5, 1892, ch. 60, § 6, 27 Stat. 25. 
99. 149 U.S. 698, 712 (1893). 
100. 149 U.S. at 707. The Court emphasized that earlier statutes had not solved 
the problem of enforcing immigration restrictions, and it dismissed the substantive 
due process question with the observation that Yick Wo. v. Hopkins, ll8 U.S. 356 
(1886), on which the aliens relied, involved state power to regulate rather than 
federal power to deport. 
101. 149 U.S. at 730. 
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If the power of Congress to exclude foreigners is absolute, of what 
legal significance are the difficulties of the State of California because 
of the "Oriental invasion"? The answer is that ... no arm of the 
Government is clothed with absolute power under the Constitution. 
No power in our Government can therefore be exercised voluntarily 
or arbitrarily, but must always be exercised in accordance with the 
spirit of the Constitution as gathered from all of its provisions .... 
Hence the elaborate defense of the Act of Congress by speaking of 
the necessity of preventing an alleged Oriental invasion.102 
This suggestion that racial classification to prevent "overpopulation" 
by one race was held to be compatible with due process could make 
the case applicable to problems of de facto segregation. 
There is much, indeed, to be said for the general proposition 
that plenary power to exclude aliens does not imply authority to act 
arbitrarily. The importance of maintaining a "regime of law" and 
of imposing proper limits on government transcends the interests 
immediately involved, whether they concern residents or nonresi-
dents.103 It is quite another matter, however, to construe the Chinese 
Exclusion Case as adopting and acting upon this principle. The fact 
that the opinion discussed the assimilability of Chinese aliens, which 
perhaps was unnecessary under the Court's basic approach, is in-
conclusive. The Court also discussed other issues which would be-
come irrelevant if nonassimilability were decisive. The point on 
which it placed chief reliance was that the exclusionary power had 
been committed to the "conclusive determination" of the political 
departments of government.104 Other alien admission cases have put 
the emphasis elsewhere, but they too disclaim rather than apply 
constitutional restraints. Thus United States ex rel. Turner v. 
Williams,105 in which an alien was excluded on the ground that he 
was an anarchist, gave first amendment freedoms the same abrupt 
treatment that had been given to racial discrimination in earlier ex-
clusion cases: 
[W]e suppose counsel does not deny that this Government has the 
power to exclude an alien who believes in or advocates the overthrow 
of the Government or of all governments by force or the assassina-
tion of officials. To put that question is to answer it. 106 
The Turner case does not delimit the protection afforded free speech, 
and the Chinese Exclusion Case does not measure the right to be free 
102. Boudin, supra note 88, at 460-61 (1951). 
103. See Hart, The Power of Congress To Limit the Jurisdiction of Federal Courts: 
An Exercise in Dialectic, 66 HARV. L. REv. 1362, 1390 (1953). 
104. Chae Chan Ping v. United States, 130 U.S. 581, 606 (1889). 
105. 194 U.S. 279 (1904). 
106. 194 U.S. at 293. 
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from racial discrimination; indeed, these cases simply do not speak 
in terms of the Bill of Rights. Instead the Court has proceeded in 
this area from the broad premise that an "alien who seeks admission 
to this country may not do so under any claim of right."107 Thus, 
since due process standards have not been applied to alien exclusion 
cases, those decisions lack persuasive appeal in areas like public 
education in which such standards are controlling.108 And even under 
a contrary interpretation, the cases would have limited precedential 
value, for subsequent decisions such as Bolling v. Sharpe,109 have 
made the federal government subject to restraints of equal protec-
tion as well as subject to nineteenth century notions of due process. 
If the Court has not held that the use of racial criteria conforms 
to the requirements of due process in exclusion cases, it certainly 
has not implied that such criteria would survive a fifth amend-
ment test in deportation proceedings. Constitutional safeguards have 
been applied far more rigorously in expulsion than in exclusion 
cases, 110 despite occasional dicta suggesting the equivalence of the 
nvo powers. Even Fong Yue Ting did not countenance expulsion of 
a race although it did approve a registration requirement applicable 
only to Chinese aliens and a presumption of unlawful entry at-
taching to noncompliance. Since there were other excluded classes 
who might have entered the country illegally, and since there were 
many lawfully resident Chinese, some of whom perhaps could not 
prove proper entry, the statute deserved much closer attention than 
it received in the majority opinion.111 At any rate, it is clear that the 
107. United States ex rel. Knauff v. Shaughnessy, 338 U.S. 537, 542 (1950). 
108. It may fairly be said that the Chinese Exclusion Case, while not applying 
due process standards, appeared to regard racial disqualifications as reasonable. The 
implications of that view for de facto school segregation would be interesting to 
contemplate if the view had been based on reliable evidence and had recent support. 
It was based, however, on the premise that Chinese aliens were nonassimilable. 
Neither that premise nor the theory that racial exclusions are reasonable has had 
much support of late. 
109. 347 U.S. 497 (1954). 
lIO. Compare Shaughnessy v. United States ex rel. Mezei, 345 U.S. 206 (1953) 
(alien seeking admission is not entitled to procedural due process), with Kwong Hai 
Chew v. Colding, 344 U.S. 590 (1953) (resident alien has constitutional right to fair 
hearing). But cf. Galvan v. Press, 347 U.S. 522 (1954), indicating that substantive due 
process standards are inapplicable to both deportation and exclusion. 
lll. The constitutional validity of an alien registration requirement was implied 
in Hines v. Davidowitz, 312 U.S. 52 (1941), but different issues are presented when 
the requirement runs against a single racial class. Closer attention should also 
have been given to the special procedural rules applied to Chinese aliens. Only 
persons of Chinese descent were required to prove lawful residence by witnesses of a 
particular race with whom they probably had limited contact. Furthermore, upon 
a claim of citizenship, the burden of proof fell on the claimant if he was Chinese, 
but on the Government in all other cases. See United States ex rel. Bilokumsky v. 
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Court viewed the provision as a means of enforcing the immigration 
law, and made no attempt to justify it on independent grounds. Con-
sequently, the racial classification sustained in Fong Yue Ting should 
be absorbed under whatever rationale underlies the immigration 
cases. 
B. Naturalization Laws and Their By-Products 
Beginning in 1790 Congress imposed racial restrictions on the 
eligibility of aliens for naturalization,112 and those restrictions led 
in tum to collateral disabilities at the state and local levels of govern-
ment. The leading cases on those respective problems were Ozawa v. 
United States113 and Terrace v. Thompson.114 In Ozawa a Japanese 
alien, who was admittedly well qualified by education and character, 
applied for American citizenship after twenty years of continuous 
residence in the United States. His application was denied on the 
ground that he was a member of the Japanese "race" and hence 
was ineligible for naturalization under a statute making citizenship 
available to "free white persons and . . . persons of African de-
scent."115 The Supreme Court, responding to certified questions of 
statutory construction, held that Japanese aliens were ineligible for 
naturalization under the quoted provision, but it did not consider 
the constitutionality of the racial disqualification. In Terrace the 
same disqualification served to restrict the freedom of Japanese aliens 
to own real property. The plaintiffs in that case sought to enjoin 
the enforcement of a state statute prohibiting land ownership by 
aliens who had not declared their intention to become citizens. The 
Court rejected a contention that the prospective application of the 
statute to prevent the leasing of property to Japanese aliens would 
violate the due process and equal protection clauses of the four-
teenth amendment: 
The rule established by Congress on this subject, in and of itself, 
furnishes a reasonable basis for classification in a state law withhold-
ing from aliens the privilege of land ownership as defined in the 
act .... 
"It is obvious that one who is not a citizen and cannot become 
one lacks an interest in, and the power to effectually work for the 
welfare of, the state, and, so lacking, the state may rightfully deny 
Tod, 263 U.S. 149 (1923). For these procedural variations, there was surely no justi-
fication. Cf. United States ex rel. Lee Kum Hoy v. Murff, 355 U.S. 169 (1957). 
112. Act of March 26, 1790, ch. 3, 1 Stat. 103. 
113. 260 U.S. 178 (1922). See also United States v. Thind, 261 U.S. 204 (1928). 
114. 263 U.S. 197 (1923). 
115. Act of July 14, 1870, ch. 254, § 7, 16 Stat. 254 [REY, STAT. § 2169], as amended, 
Act of Feb. 18, 1875, ch. 80, 18 Stat. 318. 
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him the right to own and lease real estate within its boundaries. If 
one incapable of citizenship may lease or own real estate, it is within 
the realm of possibility that every foot of land within the state might 
pass to the ownership or possession of non-citizens."116 
The naturalization and alien land cases shed no light on the 
validity of corrective classification by race. The former began and 
ended with an inquiry into the intent of Congress. No constitutional 
question seems to have been raised, and none was decided. Later 
the Court gratuitously announced in Terrace that "Congress is not 
trammeled, and it may grant or withhold the privilege of naturaliza-
tion upon any grounds or without any reason, as it sees fit."117 The 
clear implication of this dictum was that the privilege of citizenship 
could be withheld on grounds which do not satisfy fifth amendment 
standards. 
The alien land cases, on the other hand, passed directly on the 
issues of due process and equal protection. But while state incorpora-
tion of federal classification by race was there sustained, it is doubtful 
that those decisions represent the present law. The Court's lame 
analysis of the issues has been well exposed.118 The basic point is that 
federal use of a particular standard for one purpose could not es-
tablish the validity of state applications of that standard to an entirely 
different purpose. No doubt this would have been self-evident if 
the states had conditioned a criminal defendant's right to a fair 
trial upon his eligibility for citizenship. But common-law restrictions 
peculiar to land mmership119 facilitated a ruling that the naturaliza-
tion law "in and of itself furnishes a reasonable basis"120 for the state 
classification. That ruling was unsound when issued and has been un-
dermined by subsequent decisions.121 Accordingly, state courts have 
taken the initiative in repudiating the Terrace case and in holding 
alien land laws invalid on fourteenth amendment grounds.122 
IV. RELATIONS WITH INDIAN TRIBES 
Perhaps more applicable to present problems concerning the 
government's use of racial criteria is the historic differential treat-
116. 263 U.S. 197, 220-21 (1923). 
117. 263 U.S. at 220. 
118. See, e.g., McGovney, Anti-Japanese Land Laws of California and Ten Other 
States, 35 CALIF. L. REv. 7 (1947). 
119. M. KoNVITZ, supra note 88, at 148-53. 
120. Terrace v. Thompson, 263 U.S. 197, 220 (1923). 
121. Oyama v. California, 232 U.S. 633 (1948). See also Takahashi v. Fish &: Game 
Commn., 334 U.S. 410 (1948). 
122. Fujii v. State, 38 Cal. 2d 718, 242 P.2d 617 (1952); Namba v. l\IcCourt, 185 
Ore. 579, 204 P .2d 569 (1949). 
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ment of Indians. Special restrictions have been placed on the free-
dom of Indians to alienate property, and the administration of 
criminal law in the Indian country has varied, depending on whether 
those involved in the offense were Indians.123 In a few instances In-
dians have received preferential or compensatory treatment, a prac-
tice which may bear on the validity of some proposals to alleviate the 
consequences of prejudice against Negroes. 
The central question concerning the applicability of this body 
of law to other groups is whether or not the differential treatment of 
Indians is based on race. The late Felix Cohen argued vigorously 
that it is not. He emphasized that the relevant constitutional provi-
sions124 refer to Indian "tribes" and Indians "not taxed," and he 
urged that these are political designations which confer "no authority 
to govern Indians as a racial group."125 Under Cohen's view the 
special treatment of Indians can be explained by their allegiance to 
resident tribal nations, thereby making this line of precedents in-
applicable to any other class, and enabling individual Indians to 
secure nondifferential treatment by severing their tribal ties. Sup-
port for his view is implicit in the principle of tribal self-govern-
ment, which has a nonracial basis described by Chief Justice Mar-
shall in a landmark case:126 
The Indian nations had always been considered as distinct, in-
dependent, political communities .... 
. . . The very fact of repeated treaties with them recognizes 
[their right of self-government]; and the settled doctrine of the law 
of nations is, that a weaker power does not surrender its indepen-
dence-its right to self-government-by associating with a stronger, 
and taking its protection .... 
The Cherokee nation, then, is a distinct community. . . . The 
whole intercourse between the United States and this nation, is, by 
our constitution and laws, vested in the government of the United 
States.127 
123. For an extensive account of these issues, see U.S. DEPARTMENT OF THE INTERIOR, 
FEDERAL INDIAN I.Aw (1966). See also Brown, The Indian Problem and the Law, 39 
YALE L.J. 307 (1930); Cohen, Indian Rights and the Federal Courts, 24 MINN. L. REv. 
144 (1940); Krieger, Principles of the Indian Law and the Act of June 18, 1934, 3 GEO. 
WASH. L. REV. 279 (1935). 
124. The principal sources of federal authority over Indians are the commerce 
clause (U.S. CoNsr. art. 1, § 8), and the powers to make treaties (U.S. CoNsr. art. 2, 
§ 2) and to regulate territories and possessions (U.S. CoNsr. art. 4, § 3). FEDERAL INDIAN 
I.Aw, supra note 123, at 21-33. 
125. Cohen, supra note 123, at 186 (emphasis omitted). 
126. Worcester v. Georgia, 31 U.S. (6 Pet.) 515 (1832). 
127. 31 U.S. (6 Pet.) at 559-61. 
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Similar support for Cohen's thesis is found in Elk v. Wilkins,128 
which relied on tribal rather than racial factors in holding that the 
fourteenth amendment does not confer citizenship on Indians born 
in the United States: 
Indians born within the territorial limits of the United States, 
members of, and owing immediate allegiance, to one of the Indian 
tribes (an alien, though dependent, power), although in a geo-
graphical sense born in the United States, are no more "born in the 
United States and subject to the jurisdiction thereof," within the 
meaning of the first section of the Fourteenth Amendment, than 
the children of subjects of any foreign government born within the 
domain of that government, or the children born within the United 
States, of ambassadors or other public ministers of foreign nations.129 
Nevertheless, although much federal Indian law can be explained 
on a racially neutral basis, some of it cannot. For example, Congress 
has at times removed restraints on alienation of property for mixed-
blood Indians while retaining them for full-bloods. A classification 
in terms of the quantum of Indian blood is blatantly unrelated to 
tribal affiliation, and yet this statutory scheme was enforced by the 
Supreme Court in a series of cases.130 Since restraints on freedom 
of alienation were designed "to protect the Indian against sharp 
practices,''131 governmental action lifting the restraints for mixed-
bloods and preserving them for full-bloods must reflect a legislative 
determination as to the capabilities of each group. Occasionally 
courts have explicitly endorsed that determination,132 but more often 
they have simply affirmed that "it was within the power of Congress 
to continue to restrict alienation by requiring, as to full-blood In-
dians, the consent of the Secretary of the Interior to a proposed 
alienation .... "133 In either event, racial generalizations were ac-
cepted in lieu of a precise classifying trait. 
Racial considerations have similarly affected jurisdiction over 
crimes in the Indian country. Although federal criminal law extends 
generally to that territory, statutes have made it specifically inap-
128. 112 U.S. 94 (1884). 
129. 112 U.S. at 102. 
130. United States v. Waller, 243 U.S. 452 (1917); United States v. First Natl. Bank, 
234 U.S. 245 (1914); Tiger v. Western Inv. Co., 221 U.S. 286 (1911). See also United 
States v. Ferguson, 247 U.S. 175 (1918) (administrative determination of blood quantum 
held final). 
ll!l. FEDERAL INDIAN LAW, supra note 123, at '788. 
132. "The varying degrees of blood most naturally become the lines of demarca-
tion between the different classes, because experience shows that generally speaking 
the greater percentage of Indian blood a given allottee has, the less capable he is 
by natural qualification and experience to manage his property. • . ." United States 
v. Shock, 187 F. 862, 870 (I9ll). 
138. Tiger v. Western Inv. Co., 221 U.S. 286, 816 (1911). 
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plicable to offenses between Indians. In United States v. Rogers,m 
the Supreme Court construed an exemption from federal jurisdic-
tion for crimes committed "by one Indian against the person or prop-
erty of another Indian" to be based on the race of the parties rather 
than on tribal membership. In holding that a white defendant who 
had become a member of an Indian tribe through marriage was not 
exempted, the Court stated: 
[T]he exception is confined to those who by the usages and customs 
of the Indians are regarded as belonging to their race. It does not 
speak of members of a tribe, but of the race generally,-of the family 
of Indians; and it intended to leave them both, as regarded their 
own tribe, and other tribes also, to be governed by Indian usages 
and customs .... 
• . . Whatever obligations the prisoner may have taken upon him-
self by becoming a Cherokee by adoption, his responsibility to the 
laws of the United States remained unchanged and undiminished. 
He was still a white man, of the white race, and therefore not 
within the exception in the act of Congress.135 
Since federal, state, and tribal laws, and their administration are 
subject to wide variation, the Rogers interpretation placed a signif-
icant racial condition on the imposition of criminal sanctions in this 
area.1sa 
A number of civil statutes bear similar overtones of race but 
have not been authoritatively construed. One provision states that 
a "white man, not othenvise a member of any tribe" acquires no right 
to tribal property by marriage.137 The statute evidently does not 
operate against Indians or other nonwhites who are not members of 
any tribe. Federal law also provides that in all trials involving 
property disputes between an Indian and a white person "the burden 
of proof shall rest upon the white person, whenever the Indian 
shall make out a presumption of title in himself from the fact of 
previous possession or ownership."138 Finally, Congress has directed 
that preferences be given to qualified Indians in filling vacancies for 
various positions in the Indian Office.139 In some cases the mandate 
134. 45 U.S. (4 How.) 567 (1846). 
135. 45 U.S. (4 How.) at 572-73. 
136. Under provisions presently in effect, jurisdiction over crimes in the Indian 
country continues to depend in some instances on whether both the defendant and 
the victim are Indians. 18 U.S.C. §§ 1152, 1153 (1964). See FEDERAL INDIAN LAw, supra 
note 123, at 319·25. However, the current provisions have been held by lower courts 
to have tribal, not racial, connotations. E.g., State v. Williams, 13 Wash. 335, 43 P. 
15 (1895). 
137. 25 u.s.c. § 181 (1964). 
138. 25 u.s.c. § 194 (1964). 
139. 25 U.S.C. §§ 44, 46, 472 (1964). These preferences were retained in explicit 
terms by the Civil Rights Act of 1964. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(i) (1964). 
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for preferential hiring has been tied unmistakably to race rather 
than to tribal membership.140 
It is not unlikely that many commentators will look upon the 
differential treatment of the Indian as a favorable precedent for 
utilizing racial classifications to remedy injustices to the Negro. Fed-
eral Indian law has classified by race,141 and in many respects the law 
has been directed toward the protection of the disadvantaged minor-
ity. Some special treatment of the Indian might be explained by 
previous tribal relations, since those relations may have continuing 
detrimental effects which arguably the government should have 
power to neutralize. But that theory would not justify differential 
action based on quantum of Indian blood. Furthermore, the argu-
ment for preferential treatment of Negroes may legitimately urge 
that the residual effects of slavery, black codes, and segregation are 
no less debilitating than those of tribal isolation. 
Yet despite those similarities, there are compelling reasons for 
courts to hesitate in adopting the analogy. First, it should be noted 
that the special status of Indians has rested in large part on the prem-
ise that they are a vulnerable people who, for their own protection, 
must be made wards of the national government. Inasmuch as this 
assumption often referred to the weakness of Indian persons rather 
than of Indian "nations," it reflects attitudes of white supremacy142 
that are plainly at odds with the past thirty years of race relations case 
law and hence provides a dubious basis for treating other minorities. 
Second, even if the analogy between the Negro and the Indian were 
apt, the history of United States-Indian relations is scarcely one 
which inspires imitation. Instead, that history might better serve "to 
warn us that the role of the Great White Father may be bitterly re-
sented by those in his tutelage and that a guardian ordinarily prefers 
to postpone rather than to advance the day when his wards must face 
the rigors of freedom."143 Third, a racial interpretation in this area 
places undue stress on a small portion of a large body of law. Al-
though some cases involve classification by race, most of them are 
140. 25 U.S.C. § 45 (1964) (preferences for "persons of Indian descent''). 
141. This use of racial criteria cannot be explained and, hence, limited by the 
constitutional grants of power to regulate Indian affairs. See note 124 supra. Con-
sideration of race has not been confined to implementing treaties with Indian na-
tions, and may well be subject to the same restrictions for that purpose as for any 
other. Cf. Missouri v. Holland, 252 U.S. 416 (1920). Although federal control over 
United States possessions and over commerce with Indian tribes permits extensive 
regulation, this federal power should no more authorize racial distinctions than does 
the corresponding state power to regulate local commerce and local property. 
142. See note 132 supra. 
143. Bittker, The Case of the Checker-Board Ordinance: An Experiment in Race 
Relations, 71 YALE L.J. 1387, 1422 (1962). 
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responsive to Mr. Cohen's formulation.144 And when race has had a 
decisive impact, that fact should invite skepticism over the merits 
of the decision rather than its easy application to another group. 
Finally, the value of these cases as constitutional precedent is greatly 
diluted by their peculiar surrounding circumstances. The events 
which led to the decisions, including treaties and physical conquests, 
have no parallel in the background of non-Indian groups; and since 
the cases antedate modern due process developments,145 they did 
not face squarely the difficult questions inherent in racial classifi-
cation. 
V. DISCRIMINATORY JURY SELECTION 
A more current illustration of the problems of classification by 
race may be found in the discriminatory selection of jurors in crim-
inal proceedings.146 The discussion of these problems will be divided 
into three segments, two dealing with the jury venire and the third 
with the peremptory challenge. In each situation the cases raise 
major issues of racial classification, although the courts usually have 
not viewed them in those terms. 
A. Arbitrary Selection of the Jury Venire 
Strauder v. West Virginia141 was the earliest in a long series of 
jury exclusion cases. In that case, a Negro obtained review of the 
denial of several motions challenging the jury panel which convicted 
him of murder. A state statute provided that "All white male persons 
who are twenty-one years of age and who are citizens of this State 
shall be liable to serve as jurors . . . ."148 The Supreme Court over-
turned the conviction, holding that the racial limitation in the 
statute operated to deny the defendant's right to equal protection: 
The very fact that colored people are singled out and expressly 
denied by a statute all right to participate in the administration of 
the law, as jurors, because of their color ... is practically a brand 
upon them, affixed by the law, an assertion of their inferiority, and a 
stimulant to that race prejudice which is an impediment to securing 
144. See notes 124-29 supra and accompanying text. 
145. See, e.g., Palko v. Connecticut, 302 U.S. 319 (1937). 
146. Helpful discussions include Gillespie, The Constitution and the All-White 
Jury, 39 KY. L.J. 65 (1950); Scott, The Supreme Court's Control over State and Fed• 
eral Criminal Juries, 34 IOWA L. REv. 577 (1949); Note, The Congress, the Court and 
Jury Selection: A Critique of Titles I and II of the Civil Rights Bill of 1966, 52 VA. 
L. REv. 1069 (1966); Note, The Defendant's Challenge to a Racial Criterion in Jury 
Selection: A Study in Standing, Due Process and Equal Protection, 74 YALE L.J. 919 
(1965). 
147. 100 U.S. 303 (1879). 
148. Quoted in 100 U.S. at 305. 
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to individuals 0£ the race that equal justice which the law aims to 
secure to all others . 
. . • It is well known that prejudices often exist against particular 
classes in the community, which sway the judgment 0£ jurors, and 
which, therefore, operate in some cases to deny to persons 0£ those 
classes the full enjoyment 0£ that protection which others enjoy.149 
The Strauder rule was quickly applied to the discriminatory ad-
ministration of valid jury selection laws.150 After the adoption of a 
realistic standard of proof,151 the Court set aside the convictions of 
many Negroes who had been indicted or tried by a jury from which 
members of their race had been systematically excluded.152 Al-
though it has been suggested that these decisions were predicated 
either on a constitutional right to be tried by a jury drawn from a 
representative cross section of the community,1u3 or on the statutory 
right of prospective jurors not to be excluded because of race, color, 
or previous condition of servitude, 154 neither theory has won ac-
ceptance. The latter view was discarded by Hernandez v. Texas155 
which held that the exclusion of persons of Mexican descent denied 
equal protection of the laws to a defendant member of the same class; 
the former was apparently rejected in Fay v. New York156 which up-
held the use of blue ribbon panels.157 As a result, the basis for 
reversing convictions in jury selection cases remains obscure. Those 
reversals, however, could be founded on one of three beliefs: (1) 
that the exclusions operate to deny the defendant a fair trial; (2) that 
juries treat members of the excluded class more harshly than they do 
other defendants; or (3) that there is no other effective way to pro-
tect the right of minorities to participate in the administration of 
justice. 
Whatever may be its rationale, Strauder would not have raised 
any notable problem of classification if it had announced a general 
rule that no criminal conviction can stand when obtained through a 
jury system from which artificial classes are systematically excluded. 
But that is not the rule which has been adopted so far. Instead, courts 
have repeatedly stated, without giviug due regard to the serious 
149. 100 U.S. at 308-09. 
150. Neal v. Delaware, 103 U.S. 370 (1880). 
151. See Norris v. Alabama, 294 U.S. 587 (1935). 
152. E.g., Arnold v. North Carolina, 376 U.S. 773 (1964); Eubanks v. Louisiana, 356 
U.S. 584 (1958); Hill v. Texas, 316 U.S. 400 (1942). 
153. Fay v. New York, 332 U.S. 261, 298 (1947) (dissenting opinion). 
154. 18 u.s.c. § 243 (1964). 
155. 347 U.S. 475 (1954). 
156. 332 U.S. 261 (1947). 
157. The cross section theory appeared again in Labat v. Bennett, 365 F .2d 698 
(5th Cir. 1966), cert. denied, 386 U.S. 991 (1967). But see Hoyt v. Florida, 368 U.S. 57 
(1961). 
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implications of their statements, that an accused is entitled "to be in-
dicted and tried by juries from which all members of his class are 
not systematically excluded .... "158 This peculiar principle, termed 
the "same class rule," makes the defendant's affiliation with an ar-
tificial group crucial to the validity of his conviction. Consequently, 
when Negroes are excluded from the jury rolls, a criminal convic-
tion will be subject to automatic reversal if the defendant is a Negro, 
but not if he is white or Indian. Such a rule has the ironic effect of 
classifying by race, even though its purpose is to remedy racial dis-
crimination. Thus, it not only indicates the permissibility of racial 
classification in this area, but implicates the courts in that classifi-
cation, since the same class rule was judicially created and is judicially 
applied.159 
These implications cannot be avoided by suggesting that the jury 
cases reflect a rule of standing rather than one of substantive law. For 
if the defendant's right to litigate the issue of systematic exclusion of 
Negroes depends on what his own race happens to be, courts still 
will have engaged in differential treatment on the basis of race. Nor 
can the dilemma of the same class rule be resolved by reasoning 
that it classifies in terms of injury and that racial lines are merely 
coincidental. It is doubtful that black defendants are invariably 
harmed by the exclusion of blacks from the jury. In fact, there 
is considerable evidence that Negro defendants sometimes prefer to 
be tried by an all-white jury, especially in cases in which the victim 
was a Negro.160 But more fundamentally, it simply cannot be main-
158. Hernandez v. Texas, 347 U.S. 475, 482 (1954) (emphasis added). To the same 
effect see, e.g., Eubanks v. Louisiana, 356 U.S. 584, 585 (1958). All of the Supreme 
Court cases to date can be absorbed under the proposition that the arbitrary exclu-
sion of a class denies equal protection to criminally accused members of that class. 
159. The Supreme Court has not specifically endorsed the same class rule, although 
its practice over several decades of reversing only the convictions of members of the 
excluded class speaks a convincing language of its own. See Fay v. New York, 332 
U.S. 261, 287 (1947), in which the Court noted the rule with apparent approval. 
Compare State v. Brunson, 227 N.C. 558, 43 S.E.2d 82 (1947), rev'd, 333 U.S. 851 
(1948) (Negro defendant objecting to exclusion of Negroes), with State v. Koritz, 227 
N.C. 552, 43 S.E.2d 77, cert. denied, 332 U.S. 768 (1947) (companion case presenting 
same objection by white defendant). The same class rule was developed by state 
courts in response to the demands of Strauder and its progeny. Since no greater de-
mand has been indicated by the Supreme Court during the long history of the rule, 
it is not surprising to find local courts reluctant to upset criminal convictions outside 
the same class context. Alexander v. State, 160 Te.x. Crim. 460, 274 S.W .2d 81, cert. 
denied, 348 U.S. 872 (1954) (white man cannot complain of the exclusion of Negroes 
from his jury); Haraway v. State, 203 Ark. 912, 159 S.W.2d 733 (1942) (Negro cannot 
complain of exclusion of whites). Contra, State v. Lowry, 263 N.C. 536, 544, 139 
S.E.2d 870, 876 (1965). 
160. See Swain v. Alabama, 380 U.S. 202, 225 (1965); Note, Negro Defendants and 
Southern Lawyers: Review in Federal Habeas Corpus of Systematic Exclusion of 
Negroes from Juries, 72 YALE L.J. 559, 569 (1963). See also H. KALYEN &: H. ZEISEL, THE 
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tained that a defendant is prejudiced by arbitrary exclusions only if 
he is a member of the excluded class. The consequences of excluding 
Negroes may well be felt by defendants belonging to other minority 
groups such as Puerto Ricans, Indians, and even white civil rights 
workers. It is difficult, therefore, to resist the conclusion that the 
same class rule protects some defendants who have not been harmed, 
and fails to protect others who have been harmed-a conclusion 
which is inconsistent with the theory of classification by injury but 
compatible with that of judicial classification by race. 
The racial tenor of the jury cases could be eliminated, of course, 
by repudiating the same class rule and making Strauder applicable 
to all defendants who show an arbitrary exclusion of any class.161 
However, the application of such a neutral rule would undermine 
vital public policies by opening large numbers of stale convictions to 
collateral attack.162 If all persons convicted by juries drawn from an 
unconstitutional venire could collaterally challenge the panel, the 
drain on the judicial machinery would be heavy and many prisoners 
who had not been injured by the state's unlawful action might have 
to be released. Because of this potential disruption to the criminal 
law process, a racially neutral rule, if established at all, would almost 
certainly be applied only prospectively.163 But a prospective approach 
would not eradicate the racial distinctions implicit in the same class 
rule; indeed, its purpose would be to preserve those distinctions for 
use in habeas corpus proceedings and possibly in pending appeals. 
In view of the problems inherent in overturning the same class 
rule, courts may be more favorably disposed to modify it, as some 
·writers have proposed, so that the arbitrary exclusion of a class 
could be challenged by nonmember defendants on a showing of "po-
tential prejudice."164 Such a modification, which could be applied 
retrospectively, would protect white civil rights workers and some 
minority group members against the exclusion of Negroes, but it 
would not place all defendants on an equal footing. Nonmembers 
AMERICAN JURY 339.43 (1966). This preference may reflect a hope of exploiting stereo• 
types of the "Negro subculture" or a fear that Negro jurors will conform to the 
views of the white majority and will arouse community racial feeling against the 
defendant. Those considerations reveal still deeper sources of injustice to the Negro, 
but they also indicate that an all-white jury is sometimes a safer risk for him than 
one that is racially mixed. 
161. See Thiel v. Southern Pac. Co., 328 U.S. 217 (1946). 
162. See Fay v. Noia, 372 U.S. 391 (1963): Brown v. Allen, 344 U.S. 443 (1953). 
163. Cf. Johnson v. New Jersey, 384 U.S. 719 (1966): Linkletter v. Walker, 381 
U.S. 618 (1965). 
164. See, e.g., Note, The Congress, the Court and Jury Selection: A Critique of 
Titles I and 11 of the Civil Rights Bill of 1966, 52 VA. L. ID:v. 1069, 1122 (1966). 
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of the excluded class could invoke Strauder only in situations in 
which potential prejudice was detectable. Yet our knowledge of 
jury behavior and group prejudice is so limited that error in apply-
ing the proposed rule seems inevitable.165 On the other hand, a per-
son showing membership in an arbitrarily excluded class is, without 
more, entitled to a new trial. Clearly a modification of the same class 
rule which requires nonmembers of an excluded class to assume 
risks of error which members do not assume will perpetuate differ-
ential treatment along group lines. 
The principle of Strauder and its progeny appears, therefore, to 
leave little opportunity for the operation of a racially neutral stan-
dard. Those cases show that the government has power to classify 
by race outside the narrow context of wartime emergency and be-
yond the unique circumstances of United States-Indian relations.166 
The cases deal specifically with the administration of criminal jus-
tice, but the power they acknowledge is susceptible to wide appli-
cation. The same class rule operates, when Negroes are excluded 
from jury service, to protect Negro defendants while denying the 
same protection to non-Negroes. Presumably the rationale for doing 
so is that there is a rough correlation between membership in the 
excluded class and probable harm at trial.167 But if this imprecise 
correlation is sufficient to justify corrective racial classification in the 
administration of justice, then such classification may be arguably 
permissible in other areas in which there is an equally close rela-
tionship between injury and race. Of course, the same class rule re-
lates only to the remedy provided for unlawful selection of the jury 
venire,168 and the reasons for rejecting a racially neutral use of that 
remedy are compelling. It is doubtful, however, that these factors 
will make the teachings of the jury cases inapposite to other fields. 
Certainly racial classification in the public schools can be remedial, 
and rigid adherence to color-blindness can exact a heavy price in 
educational disadvantage.169 On analysis, the jury cases seem to offer 
impressive support for corrective classification by race. 
165. See H. KALVEN & H. ZEISEL, supra note 160, at 465. 
166. See text accompanying notes 56-86, 123-45 supra. 
167. Some class members, according to this rationale, are not injured by the ex-
clusions but most of them will be; and some nonmembers of the class may be 
harmed but most will not be. 
168. The selection itself is governed by a requirement of strict racial neutrality. 
Cassell v. Texas, 339 U.S. 282 (1950); Akins v. Texas, 325 U.S. 398 (1945). 
169. The action being remedied in the Strauder situation is unconstitutional, 
whereas racial isolation in the schools may be lawful, albeit undesirable. But it is 
difficult to read the Constitution to allow corrective racial classification in one case 
and not in the other so long as the government may in both circumstances regard 
the status quo as evil. Furthermore, the argument can be made that in each specific 
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B. Proportional Representation 
The cases which attempt to delineate specifically the right to non-
discriminatory selection of the jury venire, unlike those providing 
a remedy for unlawful selection, do not imply the permissibility of 
classification by race. The most instructive decision, although it did 
not yield a majority opinion, is Cassell v. Texas.170 In that case, a 
Negro convicted of murder accused the county jury commissioners 
of deliberately limiting Negroes selected to serve on each grand 
jury in proportion to the total number of blacks available for call. 
A majority of the Justices agreed that the county's jury-selection 
practices were unconstitutionally discriminatory. The prevailing 
opinion, written by Mr. Justice Reed for himself and three of his 
brethren, based its findings of discrimination on admission by com-
missioners that they chose jurors exclusively from among their ac-
quaintances and that they knew no qualified Negroes. But the 
opinion was unequivocal in condemning proportional representa-
tion: 
If • . . commissioners should limit proportionally the number of 
Negroes selected for grand-jury service, such limitation would vio-
late our Constitution ...• 
. . . [T]he Constitution requires only a fair jury selected without 
regard to race. Obviously the number of races and nationalities 
appearing in the ancestry of our citizens would make it impossible to 
meet a requirement of proportional representation. Similarly, since 
there can be no exclusion of Negroes as a race and no discrimination 
because of color, proportional limitation is not permissible.171 
Mr. Justice Frankfurter, joined by two other Justices, concurred in 
judgment on the ground that "[t]he basis of selection cannot con-
sciously take color into account."172 There was thus general agree-
ment in Cassell that there must be neither inclusion nor exclusion 
of veniremen because of race, and that states cannot purposefully 
"balance" the racial composition of juries. 
The effect of Cassell on the issues posed by de facto school segre-
gation will depend largely on the rationale of the Strauder case. If 
Strauder was based on the unfair or unequal treatment that mem-
bers of the excluded class are thought to receive from other groups, 
Cassell will be a significant obstacle to the use of racial criteria in 
case, the classification relieves the consequences of unconstitutional action, even though 
with respect to the schools the relationship is diffuse and more remote in time. See 
note 37 supra. 
170. '!,ll9 U.S. 282 (1950). 
171. '!,ll9 U.S. at 286-87. 
172. '!,'!,9 U.S. at 295 (concurring opinion). 
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the schools. That interpretation of Strauder implies that jury repre-
sentation for the defendant's class is conducive to evenhanded treat-
ment; and if state contrivance to secure such representation is con-
stitutionally proscribed in Cassell, notwithstanding the better brand 
of justice which balanced juries are presumed to dispense, similar 
efforts to control the racial composition of the schools may fail de-
spite their potentially favorable effects.173 On the other hand, Cassell 
will carry no such implication if the practice of reversing criminal 
convictions is merely an expeditious way to protect the minority's 
right to participate in the administration of justice, or if the process 
of discriminatory selection itself induces unequal treatment. Under 
those theories, proportional selection of jurors could have been for-
bidden simply because it did not advance the purpose of securing 
nondiscriminatory treatment for either the defendant or the prospec-
tive juror. Until the basis for Strauder is clarified, the impact of 
Cassell will remain uncertain. 
C. The Peremptory Challenge 
Swain v. Alabama174 brought before the Court the difficult ques-
tion whether a state's use of peremptory challenges to exclude Ne-
groes from jury service violates the equal protection clause of the 
fourteenth amendment. In that case, Swain, a Negro, was tried by 
jury for rape of a seventeen-year-old white girl. In accordance with 
Alabama's system for selecting the petit jury, a list of approximately 
seventy-five veniremen was struck, twice by the defendant and once 
by the prosecutor in alternation, until twelve jurors were left. Six 
Negroes had been available, but they were struck by the prosecutor. 
An all-white jury then found Swain guilty, and he was sentenced to 
death. In the Supreme Court he contended that the state had uncon-
stitutionally discriminated by race (1) in selecting grand jurors and 
the petit jury venire, (2) by purposefully striking six Negroes at his 
trial, and (3) by systematically exercising the strike over a period of 
years to prevent blacks from serving on the petit jury in any case. The 
first and third claims failed for lack of proof. The second was also 
rejected but not because the allegation of purposeful exclusion of 
Negroes was discredited. 
173. The two situations, however, can be distinguished. One noteworthy difference 
is that racial manipulation may be immediately self-defeating in the courts where it 
draws attention to the defendant's race and away from the relevant facts, but cor-
rective color-consciousness in the schools might not inhibit learning, In addition, a 
more persuasive factual case can be made to show the adverse effect of imbalance in 
education. See authorities cited in notes 160 supra and 245 and 248 infra. Neverthe-
less, it will not be easy to reckon with Cassell if Strauder is given this interpretation. 
174. 380 U.S. 202 (1965). 
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The Court, addressing itself to the second claim through Mr. 
Justice White, readily acknowledged that the peremptory challenge 
often is "exercised on grounds normally thought irrelevant to legal 
proceedings or official action, namely, the race, religion, nationality, 
occupation or affiliations of people summoned for jury duty."175 The 
reasons for tolerating those considerations, it stated, were found in 
the policy of the peremptory system-to guarantee impartiality in 
appearance as well as fact: 
The function of the challenge is not to eliminate extremes of 
partiality on both sides, but to assure the parties that the jurors 
before whom they try the case will decide on the basis of the evidence 
placed before them, and not otherwise. In this way the peremptory 
satisfies the rule that "to perform its high function in the best way 
'justice must satisfy the appearance of justice.' "176 
According to the Court, the purpose of the peremptory system 
would be frustrated if in a particular case state challenges based on 
unreasonable criteria were invalidated. Nevertheless, the Court pre-
ferred to speak in terms of presumptions and unreviewability, rather 
than to declare openly that prosecutors may use the challenge to 
secure an all-white jury: 
To subject the prosecutor's challenge in any particular case to the 
demands and traditional standards of the Equal Protection Clause 
would entail a radical change in the nature and operation of the 
challenge ...• 
In the light of the purpose of the peremptory system and the 
function it serves in a pluralistic society in connection with the 
institution of jury trial, we cannot hold that the Constitution re-
quires an examination of the prosecutor's reasons for the exercise of 
his challenges in any given case. The presumption in any particular 
case must be that the prosecutor is using the State's challenges to 
obtain a fair and impartial jury to try the case before the court. The 
presumption is not overcome and the prosecutor therefore subjected 
to examination by allegations that in the case at hand all Negroes 
were removed from the jury or that they were removed because they 
were Negroes.177 
The question whether or not a prosecutor can systematically strike 
all Negroes in every case was not presented by the record, but the 
Court stated that "in [such] circumstances, giving even the widest 
leeway to the operation of irrational but trial-related suspicions 
175. l!BO U.S. at 220. 
176. l!BO U.S. at 219. 
177. l!BO U.S. at 221-22. 
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and antagonisms, it would appear that the purposes of the peremp-
tory challenge are being perverted."178 
The Swain decision clearly leaves the states free in particular 
cases to classify by race in exercising the peremptory challenge. Al-
though the opinion speaks in terms of not subjecting the peremptory 
to the customary demands of equal protection, what that statement 
appears to mean is that the fourteenth amendment permits the pur-
poseful challenge of Negroes and not as in the alien exclusion cases, 
that constitutional safeguards are inapplicable.179 The rationale for 
allowing consideration of race in this situation is revealing. The 
Court at no time implied that a juror's race will affect his disposi-
tion of a case. Instead, the opinion suggested that some people be-
lieve racial factors to be significant, and evidently it is their beliefs 
which, in the interest of apparent impartiality, justify the purposeful 
exclusion of Negroes and members of other groups. Accordingly, 
Swain seems to permit racially differentiated treatment to be pre-
dicated on community attitudes which are, by hypothesis, unreason-
able. In view of the limited state interests at stake there,180 the 
Swain case may lend support to the use of racial classifications in 
other areas, including education, in which community attitudes have 
an important effect and in which injustice is not merely apparent 
but real.181 
To be sure, Swain involved a narrow issue which has tradi-
tionally been immune from judicial review. But tradition furnishes 
no adequate basis for determining the constitutionality of racial 
classifications. The Swain Court, aware of the potential for abusing 
178. 380 U.S. at 223-24. 
179. The Court did not discuss, and at times seemed consciously to obscure, the 
distinction between holding that the challenge is constitutionally permissible, and 
holding that it is impermissible in principle but insulated from inquiry in order to 
protect the peremptory system. A close reading of Swain, however, suggests that the 
purposeful challenge of Negroes is lawful, rather than undetectably lawless. The 
Court recognized that prosecutors often consider the racial affiliations of prospective 
jurors and did not intimate that this consideration was at all improper. It must have 
been expected that silence in this context would be understood as permissive. More-
over, the testimony of the prosecuting attorney in Swain made it plain that he him-
self did not disregard race in exercising the peremptory. Record at 21-22. His testi-
mony can be reconciled with the Court's inference that the challenge was properly 
used, but the explanation must be that purposeful class exclusion is allowable when 
the challenge is "trial-related." See 380 U.S. at 225; note 184 infra. 
180. Even with respect to the defendant "There is nothing in the Constitution of 
the United States which requires the Congress to grant peremptory challenges •••• " 
Stilson v. United States, 250 U.S. 583, 586 (1919), quoted with approval in Swain, 380 
U.S. at 219. 
181. The school system is not intended, like the peremptory, to permit official 
irrationality. But if equal protection requirements can be relaxed to allow irrational 
trial-related considerations in the courts, many will urge a similar result for rational 
school-related considerations in education. See note 173 supra. 
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the peremptory, indicated a readiness to strike down the systematic 
challenge of Negroes when that challenge is used in a series of cases 
in the same jurisdiction.182 Its refusal to make corresponding de-
mands in a specific case did not stem from any difference in tradi-
tion, since the challenge has generally been insulated from review 
when it is used in a series of cases as well as when it is used in 
particular ones.183 The difference turns rather on the Court's current 
appraisal of the proper role of the peremptory in judicial adminis-
tration. The Court apparently will bar the systematic use of the 
challenge to evade Strauder, but is not prepared to invalidate the 
peremptory system in order to foreclose racial limitations on jury 
service. This value judgment qualifies the principle of color-blind-
ness and produces the type of accommodation of interests which 
many will consider appropriate in other fields.184 
VI. COHABITATION AND MISCEGENATION 
The Court has discussed the question of permissible classification 
by race in its recent decisions concerning cohabitation and miscege-
genation laws. In McLaughlin v. Florida,185 the defendants, a black 
man and a white woman, were charged with habitually occupying the 
same room in violation of a Florida statute which prohibited the in-
terracial cohabitation of unmarried couples. They moved to quash 
the information on the ground that the statutory provision denied 
them the equal protection guaranteed by the fourteenth amendment. 
The state defended the statute as a means of dealing with promiscuity 
and of complementing its miscegenation law. On review the Supreme 
Court accepted the state's characterization of the statute and assumed 
arguendo that the miscegenation law was valid; it also agreed that 
the cohabitation of unmarried couples could be barred by a properly 
dravm prohibition. The principal question therefore was whether 
182. 380 U.S. at 223-24. 
183. The peremptory challenge, when available, has usually been deemed an ab-
solute power. See Lewis v. United States, 146 U.S. 370, 378 (1892); Hayes v. Missouri, 
l::!0 U.S. 68 (1887). See also F. BUSCH, LAW AND TACTICS IN JURY TRIALS 196 (1949). 
184. There are obvious differences between the peremptory challenge concept, 
which expresses a special regard for appearances, and other uses of racial classification. 
See note 181 supra. But if preservation of the peremptory system justifies the ac-
ceptance of racial disqualifications, it must be asked whether other interests, which 
are entitled to at least equally high rank, might not also support classification by 
race. Furthermore, Swain indicated approval, not mere tolerance, of some racially 
predicated challenges, such as the practice in which "striking is done differently de-
pending on the race of the defendant and the victim of the crime." 380 U.S. 202, 225 
(1965). See note 179 supra. 
185. 379 U.S. 184 (1964). 
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state power, which might validly reach all premarital cohabitation, 
could be exercised solely against interracial cohabitation. 
Mr. Justice White, writing for the Court, stated initially: 
Normally, the widest discretion is allowed the legislative judgment 
in determining whether to attack some, rather than all, of the mani-
festations of the evil aimed at; and normally that judgment is given 
the benefit of every conceivable circumstance which might suffice to 
characterize the classification as reasonable rather than arbitrary and 
invidious . . . . But we deal here with a classification based upon 
the race of the participants, which must be viewed in the light of 
the historical fact that the central purpose of the Fourteenth Amend-
ment was to eliminate racial discrimination emanating from official 
sources in the States.1sa 
In light of that statement, the state's first line of defense for the 
statute fell easily. Although the Court conceded that the provision 
protected Florida's concern for moral customs, the state had not 
urged that promiscuous conduct was more likely to result if the 
cohabiting couple was racially mixed rather than racially homoge-
neous, and the Court could find "no legislative conviction that pro-
miscuity by the interracial couple presents any particular problems 
requiring separate or different treatment . . . .''187 Thus, the Court 
had no difficulty in answering in the negative its central inquiry as 
to whether there was "some overriding statutory purpose requiring 
the proscription of the specified conduct when engaged in by a 
white person and a Negro, but not othenvise.''188 
The state's second line of defense fared no better. The Court 
recognized that the statute was rationally related to the state's mis-
cegenation policy, but again a stringent test of constitutionality was 
invoked: 
There is involved here an exercise of the state police power which 
trenches upon the constitutionally protected freedom from invidious 
official discrimination based on race. Such a law, even though enacted 
pursuant to a valid state interest, bears a heavy burden of justifica-
tion, as we have said, and will be upheld only if it is necessary, and 
not merely rationally related, to the accomplishment of a permis-
sible state policy.1so 
Because the integrity of Florida's marriage laws could be protected 
186. 379 U.S. at 191-92. 
187. 379 U.S. at 193. 
188. 379 U.S. at 192. The assumption implicit in Pace v. Alabama, 106 U.S. 583 
(1882), that equal protection requirements are met when all members of a regulated 
class are treated alike, was expressly repudiated. 
189. 379 U.S. at 196. 
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by enforcing racially neutral bans on illicit intercourse, there was 
no "necessity" for the provision at issue.180 
The negative implication of 11f.cLaughlin is that states may classify 
by race when this is necessary for a legitimate overriding purpose. 
Understandably, the case has been viewed as supporting the use of 
racial criteria to attack de facto segregation. Writers have urged that 
McLaughlin enables the schools to classify racially for the purpose of 
correcting imbalance,191 and one court has declared broadly that 
racial classification in the schools satisfies whatever burden of justi-
fication is required.192 
This plausible application of McLaughlin, however, overlooks 
the essential ambiguity of Mr. Justice White's opinion. It is not self-
evident that classification by race will serve an "overriding" pur-
pose in the schools.193 The obj'ections of some blacks to integrated 
education and the costs involved in achieving integration through 
racially based measures should caution against a facile response to 
competing claims.194 Nor is it clear that such measures will qualify 
as "necessary." The latter term has been narrowly construed in 
other areas in which it measures fundamental rights.195 Furthermore, 
some progress in reducing imbalance can be realized through racially 
neutral remedies, and McLaughlin does not state that racial 
classifications may be employed to advance an objective which is 
190. Justice Stewart, joined by Justice Douglas, concurred on the ground that "it is 
simply not possible for a state law to be valid under our Constitution which makes the 
criminality of an act depend upon the race of the actor." 379 U.S. at 198 (emphasis 
added). The careful omission of any reference to federal power may have been intended 
to accommodate the Japanese Relocation Cases in which Justice Douglas voted with 
the Court. But if federal law making criminality turn on race is sometimes valid, it is 
not as "simple" as the opinion implies to condemn state laws in such universal terms. 
191. Carter, De Facto School Segregation: An Examination of the Legal and Con-
stitutional Questions Presented, 16 W. REs. L. REv. 502 (1965). 
192. Springfield School Comm. v. Barksdale, 348 F.2d 261 (1st Cir. 1965). 
193. "This higher burden requires that a state show ••• that the public interest 
involved outweighs the detriments that will be incurred by the affected private parties. 
In calculating the magnitude of the public need for the measure, the courts must 
consider both the extent of the benefits accruing to society and the degree of risk 
which will be incurred if a measure of that nature is not permitted. Similarly, the 
actual costs of the measure must be determined by examining both the importance of 
the individual or group rights infringed and the extent to which the measure will 
have long-term adverse effects on those interests." Developments in the Law-Equal 
Protection, 82 HARv. L. REv. 1067, 1103 (1969). 
194. For a description of some of these costs see notes 252, 279, and 298 infra. It 
has also been argued that quality education might be better achieved by improving 
de facto segregated schools than by integrating the races. See J. CONANT, SLUMS AND 
SunURBs 27-32 (1961). The views of educators have undergone some change as the 
effects of racial imbalance have become more fully understood, but there is still much 
debate over the relative advantages of various ways to equalize educational oppor-
tunity. 
195. See generally Wormuth &: Mirkin, The Doctrine of the Reasonable Alterna-
tive, 9 UTAH L. REv. 254 (1964). 
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partially attainable in other ways. The necessity test suggests 
that race cannot be made a classifying trait if other standards will 
eliminate imbalance. But the test does not indicate whether racial 
classifications may be utilized to achieve a better balance, and in 
most circumstances that is the critical issue.196 
Reliance upon McLaughlin is also called into question by the 
fact that the Court actually applied the restriction against classifi-
cation by race far more rigorously in that case than it had in the past. 
Earlier opinions characterized racial distinctions as "suspect" and 
subject to "rigid scrutiny."197 But those generalities had neither fore-
closed all racial lines nor confined their use to situations in which 
alternative measures were certain to fail. The close review in 1'1c-
Laughlin is especially revealing in light of the state's undisputed 
power to proscribe premarital cohabitation. The objection to the 
Florida statute was based solely on its underinclusiveness, a defect 
that is ordinarily subject to "the widest discretion."198 Since the mis-
cegenation provision was assumed to be valid, the usual requirement 
that an underinclusive classification be supported by fair reasons 
might have been met in the case of interracial cohabitation. Under 
that assumption, the state could well have concluded that the risks 
of illegitimacy involved in the cohabitation of couples who are pro-
hibited from intermarrying call for special treatment. Moreover, if 
the miscegenation law is accepted as valid, racially mixed couples 
might be treated differently for whatever reasons underlie that law. 
These considerations could not save the cohabitation statute and 
did not require full examination of the miscegenation issue but only 
because the Court applied so stringent a standard to test the classifica-
tion. Adoption of such a restricted view of permissible classification 
by race cannot easily be reconciled with the nation of increased tol-
erance for racial lines. 
The questions concerning the constitutionality of miscegenation 
laws, which McLaughlin purported to reserve, were answered in 
sweeping terms by Loving v. Virginia.199 The Lovings, a white man 
and a black woman, were married in the District of Columbia and 
shortly thereafter made their home in Virginia, where both had been 
residents immediately before the marriage. They were indicted on 
charges of violating a Virginia statute which read: 
196. It might be possible to invoke McLaughlin by defining the objective in terms 
of changing the Negro-white ratio by some precise percentage, but the fictive quality 
of that approach is transparent. 
197. Bolling v. Sharpe, 347 U.S. 497 (1954); Korematsu v. United States, 323 U.S. 
214 (1949). 
198. 379 U.S. 184, 191 (1964). 
199. 388 U.S. l (1967). 
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If any white person and colored person shall go out of this State, for 
the purpose of being married, and with the intention of returning, 
and be married out of it, and afterwards return to and reside in it, 
cohabiting as man and wife, they shall be punished as provided in 
[this state's anti-miscegenation statute], and the marriage shall be 
governed by the same law as if it had been solemnized in this 
State.200 
The miscegenation law cited in this statute prohibited the inter-
marriage of any "white person" with any "colored person."201 The 
defendants were sentenced on pleas of guilty to a year in jail, 
but the sentences were suspended for twenty-five years on the con-
dition that they leave the state and not return during that period of 
time. Four years later the Lovings filed a motion to vacate judgment 
on grounds that the Virginia statutes denied them due process and 
equal protection, and ultimately the issues were taken to the Su-
preme Court. 
Chief Justice Warren's opinion for the Court, relying heavily on 
the McLaughlin case, disposed of those issues and of all miscege-
nation laws in a few paragraphs. In the Court's view, the fact that 
the statutes restricted freedom of whites as well as of blacks was in-
sufficient to satisfy the demands of equal protection since the pro-
visions classified racially. Classification by race, the Court implied, 
may be unconstitutional per se: 
At the very least, the Equal Protection Clause demands that racial 
classifications, especially suspect in criminal statutes, be subjected to 
the "most rigid scrutiny" ... and, if they are ever to be upheld, they 
must be shown to be necessary to the accomplishment of some per-
missible state objective, independent of the racial discrimination 
which it was the object of the Fourteenth Amendment to elimi-
nate.202 
As in the School Segregation Cases, the legislative history of the 
fourteenth amendment was found to be "inconclusive." But unlike 
Brown, the Loving opinion made no use of available social science 
evidence. Instead the Court brusquely announced that miscegenation 
laws are constitutionally unjustified: 
200. VA. CODE ANN, § 20-58 (1960), repealed, Act of April 2, 1968, ch. 318, § 2, 
(1968] Acts of Assembly 428. 
201. The latter term was defined by the statutes as a person "in whom there is 
ascertainable any Negro blood," VA. CODE ANN. § 1-14 (1966), and the former as one 
having "no trace whatever of any blood other than Caucasian." VA. CODE ANN. § 20-54 
(1960). But persons having "one-sixteenth or less of the blood of the American Indian 
and having no other non-Caucasic blood" were deemed "white,'' and those having 
"one-fourth or more of Indian blood and less than one-sixteenth of Negro blood" were 
deemed tribal Indians. VA. CODE ANN. § 1-14 (1966). 
202. 388 U.S. I, II (1967). The word "they" seems to refer to all racial classifications 
rather than only to those incorporated in criminal statutes. 
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There is patently no legitimate overriding purpose independent 
of invidious racial discrimination which justifies this classification. 
The fact that Virginia only prohibits interracial marriages involving 
white persons demonstrates that the racial classifications must stand 
on their own justification, as measures designed to maintain White 
Supremacy .... There can be no doubt that restricting the freedom 
to marry solely because of racial classifications violates the central 
meaning of the Equal Protection Clause.203 
Such laws, the Chief Justice added, also abridge the liberty secured 
by the due process clause. 
Whatever importance Loving may have in destroying a symbol 
of racial separateness, it contributes relatively little toward resolv-
ing issues of classification by race. The Court's reference to a per se 
rule is unlikely to have any appreciable impact in the face of 
contrary precedent and in the absence of reasoned discussion. Aside 
from that reference, Loving merely reiterates the McLaughlin stan-
dard without amplifying it. As might be expected, the application 
of this flexible formula yielded appealing results in the immediate 
case, but offered scant guidance for the future.204 Indeed, since the 
Court identified the disputed classification with a design to main-
tain white supremacy, the decision offers virtually no guidance at 
all for cases involving "non-invidious" uses of racial criteria. 
VII. ENCOURAGING AND DISCOURAGING PRIVATE DISCRIMINATION 
A. Anti-Discrimination Laws 
Federal and state anti-discrimination laws, which bear tangen-
tially on the question of permissible classification by race, have con-
sistently been upheld by the Supreme Court. The leading case is 
203. 388 U.S. at ll-12. The Court expressly disclaimed any reliance on Virginia's 
failure to extend the miscegenation bar to nonwhites, and it ruled the statutes in-
valid "even assuming an even-handed state purpose to protect the 'integrity' of all 
races." 388 U.S. at II n.ll. 
204. The adaptability of McLaughlin is illustrated by the number of options avail-
able to the Court in overturning the convictions in Loving. The Court could have 
struck down Virginia's evasion statute without passing on the miscegenation law, 
exactly as McLaughlin had done; since a racially neutral provision operating against 
all couples ineligible to marry in Virginia would fully protect state interests. Alterna-
tively, the Court could have held that Virginia's miscegenation law, which prohibited 
only miscegenetic marragies involving whites, served no legitimate purpose because 
it did not "protect" other races or because such protection is not a proper govern-
mental functioh. The latter rationale would have required the Court to deal with 
conflicting expert opinion on whether the effects of psychological pressures on misce-
genetic families justify regulations; the former would have reached only the Virginia 
statutes. By drawing an easy inference that miscegenation laws do not serve an "over-
riding" purpose, the Court managed both to address itself to miscegenation laws 
in general and to avoid a full discussion of the interests they allegedly safeguarded. 
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Railway Mail Association v. Corsi.205 At issue in that case was the 
validity of a state statute which prohibited labor unions from denying 
membership to any person because of race, color, or creed. A New 
York City branch of a postal clerks' organization sought a declaration 
that the statute infringed rights of due process guaranteed by the 
fourteenth amendment. The Court easily rejected that contention: 
A judicial determination that such legislation violated the Four-
teenth Amendment would be a distortion of the policy manifested in 
that amendment, which was adopted to prevent state legislation de-
signed to perpetuate discrimination on the basis of race or color. 
We see no constitutional basis for the contention that a state can-
not protect workers from exclusion solely on the basis of race, color 
or creed by an organization, functioning under the protection of the 
state, which holds itself out to represent the general business needs 
of employees.206 
Since Corsi involved a government employer and a metropolitan 
branch of the union, it was to be expected that the decision would 
result either in desegregating or in dismantling the organization.207 
The case thus indicates that a ban on private discrimination which 
has the probable effect of compelling desegregation, and thereby re-
stricting the associational freedom of those who would otherwise 
discriminate, is constitutionally valid.208 Nevertheless, Corsi should 
not be read for the broad proposition that states may force private 
groups--and a fortiori, the public schools--to integrate. Such an 
interpretation confuses nondiscrimination, which the New York 
statute required, with integration, which the statute might have 
achieved but did not command. Anti-discrimination laws are entirely 
consistent with governmental neutrality toward integration,209 and 
the cases sustaining them do not control the validity of measures to 
correct imbalance through racial classification. The statutes classify 
racially only in the sense that they single out race as an impermis-
sible basis for private discrimination, while leaving other arbitrary 
205. 326 U.S. 88 (1945). 
206. 326 U.S. at 93-94. 
207. See Colorado Anti-Discrimination Commn. v. Continental Air Lines, Inc., 372 
U.S. 714, 721 (1963) (declaring official job discrimination to be unconstitutional). 
208. To the same effect see Heart of Atlanta Motel, Inc. v. United States, 379 U.S. 
241 (1964), and cases cited therein. 
209. The primary purpose of an anti-discrimination policy is to promote equal 
opportunity; the effect of the policy on racial interaction, even assuming full enforce-
mer.t, will vary. Often nondiscrimination !'•oduces integration, but occasionally it may 
inhibit efforts to integrate. Cf. Hughi>:; v. Superior Court, 339 U.S. 460 (1950), which 
upheld a state court injunction ap:nst picketing for the purpose of inducing an em-
ployer to hire Negro workers j~ proportion to Negro customers. 
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differentiation unregulated. This distinction, however, presents no 
serious classification problem. 
B. Official Designation of Race 
Unlike anti-discrimination laws, racial designations raise substan-
tial constitutional problems in a variety of fields. The post-Brown 
Court first encountered this issue in Anderson v. Martin.210 In that 
case two Negro candidates for the school board in East Baton Rouge, 
Louisiana, sought an injunction against the enforcement of a state 
statute requiring that all nomination papers and ballots in public 
elections indicate the race of each candidate. Characterizing the pur-
pose of the statute as "purely racial," the Supreme Court rejected 
an attempt to justify the provision as a means of informing the 
electorate: "We see no relevance in the State's pointing up the race 
of the candidate as bearing upon his qualifications for office."211 The 
Court held unanimously that the compulsory designation of race on 
the ballot was repugnant to the equal protection clause of the four-
teenth amendment: 
[B]y placing a label on a candidate at the most crucial stage in the 
electoral process-the instant before the vote is cast-the State fur-
nishes a vehicle by which racial prejudice may be so aroused as to 
operate against one group because of race and for another . . . . 
Hence, in a State or voting district where Negroes predominate, that 
race is likely to be favored by a racial designation on the ballot, 
while in those communities where other races are in the majority, 
they may be preferred. The vice lies not in the resulting injury but 
in the placing of the power of the State behind a racial classification 
that induces racial prejudice at the polls.212 
The Supreme Court's decision in Anderson, however, should be 
considered together with its holding in Tancil v. Woolls.213 The 
plaintiffs in the latter case sought declaratory and injunctive relief 
against the enforcement of several Virginia statutes which required 
public officials to designate race on certain records and to separate 
some listings racially. A three-judge federal district court struck 
down provisions calling for notations of race and for racially sep-
arated entries on voting and property records: 
[T]hey serve no other purpose than to classify and distinguish official 
210. 375 U.S. 399 (1964). 
211. 375 U.S. at 403. 
212. 375 U.S. at 402. 
213. 379 U.S. 19 (1964), afj'g Hamm v. Virginia State Bd. of Elections, 230 F. Supp. 
156 (E.D. Va. 1964) (per curiam). 
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records on the basis of race or color .... The infirmity of the pro-
visions ... lies in their mandate of separation of names by race.214 
It upheld a statute directing that every decree of divorce recite 
the race of the parties, stating that "[v]ital statistics, obviously, are 
aided"215 thereby. The controlling principle was expressed in terms 
of the legislative purpose: 
Of course, the designation of race, just as sex or religious de-
nominations, may in certain records serve a useful purpose, and the 
procurement and compilation of such information by State authori-
ties cannot be outlawed per se. For example, the securing and 
chronicling of racial data for identification or statistical use violates 
no constitutional privilege. If the purpose is legitimate, the reason 
justifiable, then no infringement results.216 
But the district court evaded the most interesting question in the 
case when it declined to apply this rule to the racial designations, 
without more, on voting and property records. Since those notations 
would have aided vital statistics no less than the notations on divorce 
decrees, but were far more susceptible to misuse, they presented a 
crucial test for the court's general principle. Rather than meet that 
test, the court read the designation provisions in conjunction with 
other sections of the Virginia Code which called for separate listings 
of whites and Negroes.217 So viewed, the provisions were infected 
by a "mandate of separation" and were held unenforceable insofar 
as they required officials "to note and show separately the names of 
... white or colored persons."218 In the Supreme Court the judgment 
was affirmed without opinion or citation of authority.219 
Tancil and Anderson offer few fresh insights into the question of 
permissible classification by race. The racial classifications in these 
cases, unlike the classifications in the several lines of decisions con-
sidered above, did not impose racially differentiated treatment on 
214. Hamm v. Virginia State Bd. of Elections, 230 F. Supp. 156, 158 (E.D. Va. 
1964) (court's emphasis). 
215. 230 F. Supp. at 158. 
216. 230 F. Supp. at 158. 
217. Section 58-790 of the Virginia Code, directing assessors to note race, was 
treated together with § 58-804, requiring the Department of Taxation to main-
tain separate land books. Section 24-118, authorizing counties to keep voter registra-
tion lists on serially numbered cards or loose leaf binders with different colored sheets 
for whites and Negroes, was invalidated even though it seemed to incorporate only 
racial designations. Perhaps this requirement was deemed to be tainted by § 24-28 
which required the State Board of Elections to maintain racially separated lists. 
These provisions are now found in VA. CODE ANN. §§ 24-28, 24-118, 58-790, 58-804 
(1969). 
218. Quoted from the final order of the court in 9 RACE REI.. L. REP. 919, 921 
(1964). 
219. !179 U.S. 19 (1964) (per curiam). 
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any person.220 But although the state's action did not vary with the 
race of the individual, there was a danger that the notations on the 
ballot might encourage racially differentiated action by voters. The 
decision in the Anderson case afforded the traditional protection 
against this official involvement in racial discrimination. The Su-
preme Court ruled that the validity of the statute did not depend on 
which race was disadvantaged, and that the states should not use 
race as a shorthand indicator of other factors, such as personal beliefs 
and experience, which are themselves quite relevant. Tancil, on the 
other hand, held that the notation on divorce decrees was a valid 
racial classification. That case may provide authority for state de-
cisions requiring school officials to conduct a racial census,221 al-
though even that prospect is uncertain in view of the Supreme 
Court's ambiguous disposition of Virginia's other race notations. In 
any event, the validity of corrective action in the schools is not il-
luminated by a judgment sustaining only the collection of some data. 
It is possible that greater significance will emerge from these 
cases when the basis for the result in Tancil is explained.222 For 
the present, there is clarity only at two extremes: racial designations 
are prohibited on the ballot, where they threaten serious harm; and 
they are allowable on divorce decrees, where they serve legitimate 
state aims. In many situations, however, race notations will be both 
useful and threatening. For example, governmental power to gather 
racial data is vital to the integrity of anti-discrimination laws,223 and 
the exercise of such a power was apparently contemplated by the 
Civil Rights Act of 1964.224 Yet the same data which help an official 
enforcement agency to detect discrimination may sometimes aid 
220. See notes 263-97 infra regarding the distinction between racially differentiated 
treatment of individuals and other types of racial classifications. 
221. School Comm. of New Bedford v. Commissioner of Educ., 349 Mass. 410, 208 
N.E.2d 814 (1965). For a case sustaining such a census in the context of de jure segre-
gation, see Lee v. Macon County Bd. of Educ., 267 F. Supp. 458 (M.D. Ala.), aff'd per 
curiam sub nom. Wallace v. United States, 389 U.S. 215 (1967). 
222. Tancil v. Woolls is a classic example of what should not be decided per 
curiam. There is no way of knowing whether the Supreme Court's action meant that 
the racial designations on voting and property records were unconstitutional or 
whether it meant that, as the lower court had decided, the records were unlawfully 
segregated. And if the designations themselves were invalid, there is no way of know-
ing why. The district court measured the validity of official race notations by the 
legitimacy and justifiability of their purpose, a test similar to that later adopted in 
the McLaughlin case. But there is little discernable difference in purpose between 
noting race on a divorce decree and noting it on various other records. A test drawn 
in these terms, like the distinction between direct and indirect legal effects, may serve 
the function "of stating, rather than of reaching, a result." Wickard v. Filburn, 317 
U.S. 111, 123 (1942). 
223. See M. SOVERN, UGAL REsTRAINTS ON RACIAL DISCRIMINATION IN EMPLOYMENT 
125-27 (1966). 
224. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-8(c) (1964). See M. SOVERN, supra note 223, at 85-89. 
June 1969] Permissible Classification by Race 1601 
private employers who wish to practice it.225 Under these circum-
stances it is a fair guess that, while safeguards will have to be de-
veloped, they will not take the form of a complete ban on the col-
lection of racial information. But since no compromise can entirely 
prevent misuse of the data,226 this problem illustrates the need for 
flexibility even when racial classifications carry some risk. 
VIII. PERCENTAGE REQUIREMENTS IN SCHOOL DESEGREGATION 
In United States v. Montgomery County Board of Education221 
the Supreme Court approved for the first time the use of percent-
age requirements in disestablishing de jure segregated school systems. 
That case, the latest in a series of decisions implementing Brown, 
involved the assignment of faculty and staff members in Montgom-
ery County, Alabama. Suit was originally filed in a federal district 
court in 1964, and findings were entered which showed that teachers 
as well as students were assigned to local schools strictly on the basis 
of race. After issuing a number of orders for desegregation of the 
student body, the federal court directed the school board to end fac-
ulty segregation in the 1966 academic year.228 Nevertheless, in 1968 
when motions were heard which culminated in the order which was 
reviewed by the Supreme Court, the district judge found extensive 
evidence of continued discriminatory practices. New schools had 
been constructed, existing schools expanded, and transportation and 
athletic programs maintained in a manner wholly calculated to 
perpetuate the dual system of education. With respect to faculty and 
staff assignments-the only aspect of the dispute to reach the Su-
preme Court-the evidence of willful segregation was unmistakable. 
Negro substitute teachers had been employed more than 1,500 times 
during the previous semester and in every instance had been assigned 
to traditionally Negro schools; white substitutes had been employed 
more than 2,000 times, with only token assignments to nonwhite 
schools. The pattern for night school and for student and full-time 
teaching staffs was much the same. In all, about 1,365 teachers served 
225. This is especially true when the employer engages in quota hiring in order 
to protect himself against a charge of discrimination. See ·winter, Improving the Eco-
nomic Status of Negroes Through Laws Against Discrimination: A Reply to Professor 
Sovern, 34 U. CHI. L. REv. 817 (1967). 
226. Those who believe that the principal danger lies in state and local collection 
of racial data may seek refuge in the doctrine of pre-emption, at least so far as em-
ployment records are concerned. The inevitable cost of doing so will be the dimin-
ished effectiveness of state anti-discrimination laws. 
227. 395 U .s. 225 (1969). 
228. The board was later allowed one more year for compliance. A detailed factual 
account of the Montgomery County litigation may be found in the memorandum 
opinion of the district court. 289 F. Supp. 647 (M.D. Ala. 1968). 
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in Montgomery County, and approximately 1,333 were assigned to 
faculties composed predominantly of members of their own race. 
Against the background of this response to the general mandate 
for desegregation, the district judge "concluded that a more specific 
order would be appropriate ... to establish the minimum amount 
of progress that would be required for the future."229 He therefore 
announced an "ultimate objective in faculty desegregation" calling 
for the ratio of white to Negro teachers, then about 3 to 2 for the 
system as a whole, to be "substantially the same" in each school. To 
begin implementing this goal, he ordered that the following year at 
least one-sixth of the regular teachers and staff in each school be 
members of their faculty's racial minority, although schools with 
fewer than twelve teachers were required to have only one or more 
members of the minority race. The ratio of white to black substitute, 
night, and student teachers was to be substantially the same in each 
school. On review, the court of appeals agreed that the school board 
had failed to comply with general orders to desegregate the faculty 
and that there was "a need for specific directives in the instant 
case,"230 but it modified some of the ratios adopted by the district 
judge. 
The Supreme Court characterized the issues between the parties, 
which reflected the differences in the lower court orders, as "ex-
ceedingly narrow" and resolved them virtually without legal dis-
cussion. The Court made passing references to the school board's 
"responsibility to achieve integration as rapidly as practicable"281 
and stressed that the ratios in question were not intended to be 
rigid and inflexible. It then stated that the order of the district judge 
would "expedite, by means of specific commands, the day when a 
completely unified, unitary, nondiscriminatory school system be-
comes a reality instead of a hope."232 With that observation, it re-
manded the case to the Fifth Circuit and directed that the judg-
ment of the district court be affirmed. 
There are obvious aspects of color-consciousness in the Mont-
gomery County case,233 but, contrary to some impressions carried 
in the popular press, 234 the decision does not validate the allocation 
of government jobs or of any other official benefit on the basis of 
229. 395 U.S. 225, 232 (1969). 
230. 400 F.2d 1, 6 (5th Cir. 1968). 
231. 395 U.S. 225, 230 (1969). But see text accompanying notes 27-30 supra. Previous 
cases had identified the goal somewhat more vaguely as a "unitary" school system. 
Green v. County School Bd., 391 U.S. 430 (1968). 
232. 395 U.S. 225, 235 (1969). 
233. See note 237 infra. 
234. TIME, June 13, 1969, at 66. 
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race. Both the district court and the Supreme Court defended the 
use of ratios as a means of assuring desegregation through more spe-
cific orders, and neither intimated that teachers would be subjected 
to racially differentiated treatment. The history of the Montgomery 
County litigation attested to the inadequacy of general mandates; 
in fact, some school officials had themselves indicated a need for 
more precise instructions. The use of ratios in these circumstances 
followed the course taken by the Fifth Circuit a year earlier when it 
accepted the Guidelines of the Department of Health, Education, 
and Welfare as "a general rule of thumb or objective administrative 
guide for measuring progress in desegregation .... "235 The ratios, 
like the Guidelines, were designed to induce compliance with Brown 
and not to legitimate the discriminatory allotment of official benefits 
or burdens. This point was made clear, not only by the repeated 
insistence in the Montgomery County opinions that the ratios spe-
cifically define rather than modify Brown ll's mandate for a "non-
discriminatory school system," but also by other features of the 
district court's desegregation plan. For that plan required un-
equivocally that potential burdens, such as the displacements of 
teachers, be administered on a nonracial basis: 
Teachers and other professional staff members will not be dis-
criminatorily assigned, dismissed, demoted, or passed over for reten-
tion, promotion, or rehiring, on the ground of race or color .... If, 
as a result of desegregation, there is to be a reduction in the total 
professional staff of the school system, the qualifications of all staff 
members in the system will be evaluated in selecting the staff mem-
ber to be released without consideration of race or color.236 
In this connection, it is crucial to recognize that all of the court's 
ratio requirements can be satisfied through a racially neutral assign-
ment of school personnel. Since 60 per cent of the county's teachers 
are white and 40 per cent are black, compliance with the order for 
a minimum minority ratio of one-in-six among the regular faculty 
can surely be effected without subjecting teachers to racially differen-
tiated treatment. Indeed, the laws of probability make it difficult not 
to attain that ratio if teaching assignments are genuinely nonracial. 
And the laws of probability likewise demonstrate that racially neu-
tral action can produce "substantially the same" ratio of white to 
black substitute, night, and student teachers in each school.237 What 
235. United States v. Jefferson County Bd. of Educ., 372 F.2d 836, 886-87 (1966), 
aff'd en bane, 380 F.2d 385 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 389 U.S. 840 (1967). 
236. 12 RACE REL. L. REP. 1200, 1205-06 (1967). 
237. "Racially neutral action" refers to treatment of teachers. This term, however, 
does not imply a school policy which is "neutral" in the sense of being indifferent to 
the racial composition of various faculties. For example, a random assignment plan and 
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Montgomery County requires therefore is that the school board stop 
its discriminatory practices, not that it initiate new ones. 
It is conceivable, of course, that the future use of ratios in dis-
mantling dual school systems may involve differential treatment 
based on race. If ratios become "rigid and inflexible"-qualities 
which the Supreme Court took pains to note were absent in Mont-
gomery County-they may be unattainable by neutral means. At-
tempts will probably then be made to distinguish between imposing 
racially focused burdens as a corrective for de jure segregation and 
imposing them for other reasons.238 The pressure to adopt this ra-
tionale and to prescribe more severe ratios will be intense so long 
as the promise of the school cases remains unfulfilled. Whether local 
intransigence will persuade the Supreme Court to order racially dif-
ferentiated treatment of students and teachers in a final effort to 
implement Brown cannot be prophesied, but that step was not taken 
in the Montgomery County case. 
IX. GENERAL POLICY CONSIDERATIONS 
The discussion above shows that the decisions of the Supreme 
Court do not establish a rigid principle of constitutional color-
a free choice plan might both be racially neutral toward teachers; but if the school 
board chose between those plans, it would have to be mindful of their comparative 
impact on segregation. There is thus an important element of color-consciousness in 
Montgomery County, an element which is implicit in any affirmative effort to desegre• 
gate. But there are vast differences between achieving desegregation through racially 
differentiated burdens and achieving it through the uniform treatment of all races. See 
United States v. Jefferson County Bd. of Educ., 372 F.2d 836, 876 (5th Cir. 1966), affd 
en bane, 380 F.2d 385 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 389 U.S. 840 (1967), on which the trial 
judge in the instant case placed heavy reliance, which stated that "a classification that 
denies a benefit, causes harm, or imposes a burden must not be based on race." To the 
extent that attacks on imbalance in northern schools involve racially predicated bur-
dens, as they often do, the Montgomery County case is readily distinguishable. See 
note 262 infra regarding other color-conscious attempts to alleviate imbalance. 
The Montgomery County Board of Education will have considerable latitude in 
selecting faculty desegregation measures, since the dual school system must have pro-
duced both white and black teachers for each grade and for each subject. The Board 
is unlikely to resort to completely random assignment, although this would yield the 
required results; but other racially neutral measures, including random assignment 
of the teachers with lowest seniority, could be highly effective. The Board's own plans, 
in fact, contemplated nearly as much integration as is now required, 289 F. Supp. 647, 
658 (M.D. Ala. 1968), despite an apparent policy of retaining most teachers in their 
present schools-a policy which cannot be deemed nonracial since it acquiesces in past 
discriminatory appointments. 
238. The judicial supervision exercised over the disestablishment of dual school 
systems has been advanced as a basis for distinguishing. Developments in the Law-
Equal Protection, 82 HARV. L. REv. 1067, 1108-09 n.192 (1969). The flexible standard 
set forth in McLaughlin v. Florida, 379 U.S. 184 (1964), might also be used to accom• 
modate the distinction. See notes 185-96 supra and accompanying text. And finally, 
Montgomery County may quite possibly be read for more than it is worth. For an 
analysis of racially differentiated treatment outside the context of de jure segregation 
see notes 263-90 infra and accompanying text. 
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blindness. Rather, the opinions, although not yielding a clear neutral 
principle, suggest that in appropriate circumstances-usually de-
scribed in terms of "justification"-the state and national govern-
ments may classify by race. The value of the cases as precedent for 
such classification in de facto segregated schools is varied; but even 
if the decisions were more uniformly apposite, policy considerations 
would inevitably affect the ultimate disposition of the problem. The 
remainder of this Article will therefore deal with some of those con-
siderations.230 It will focus on the validity of purposeful integration 
in principle and on the ways in which that objective may be ad-
vanced.240 A concluding section will examine black separatism as 
an alternative route to educational equality. 
A. Purposeful School Integration in Principle 
The threshold question is whether or not the racial composition 
of the schools is a valid governmental concern. A negative answer to 
that question, unlike a ruling that particular measures are improper 
because they intrude on constitutionally protected rights, would 
deliver a fatal blow to all conscious efforts to integrate de facto segre-
gated schools. The issue requires discussion of the effects of racial 
and social class isolation on student attitudes and achievement, as 
well as a consideration of specific objections to purposeful integration 
in princi pie. 
Correction of imbalance in the public schools will produce both 
racial interaction and social class interaction, and recent studies 
have documented the favorable effects of those contacts. The Cole-
man Report,241 prepared for the Office of Education in response to 
a Congressional mandate for a national survey of educational op-
portunity, found that pupil achievement varies directly with the 
social class level of the student body. It concluded: 
Attribu.tes of other students account for far more variation in the 
239. These factors are crucial not only because of their impact on education but 
also because of their potential applicability to racial classifications in other areas, 
including employment and housing. Federal power to enforce the fourteenth amend-
ment in these fields is extensive under Katzenbach v. Morgan, 384 U.S. 641 (1966), but 
that case did not remove the restraints on official classification by race. But cf. Devel-
opments, supra note 238, at 1109-11. 
240. The term "purposeful integration" refers to action that has the purpose and 
effect of producing racial balance, as distinguished from action which achieves a 
fortuitous balance but which is adopted to effectuate nonracial policies. If integra-
tion is an allowable state goal-that is, permissible "in principle"-debate will then 
center on methods of implementation. 
241. U.S. DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH, EDUCATION, AND WELFARE, OFFICE OF EDUCATION, 
EQUALITY OF EDUCATIONAL OPPORTUNITY ij. Coleman ed. 1966) [hereinafter COLEMAN 
REPORT]. 
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achievement of minority group children than do any attributes of 
school facilities and slightly more than do attributes of staff. 
In general, as the educational aspirations and backgrounds of fel-
low students increase, the achievement of minority group children 
increases.242 
Furthermore the higher achievement of minority group children 
in schools with a higher social class level is not offset by commen-
surate disadvantage to the more privileged students;243 rather, it 
appears that "in a school containing a mixture of lower and middle 
class children the total educational product is greater than if the 
classes were segregated.''244 The evidence in the Report, together 
with corroborative data gathered in other investigations,2415 is more 
than adequate to substantiate the state's interest in the social class 
composition of the schools.246 This interest in turn can be said to 
support the validity of integrating by race, since racial balance will 
tend to produce social class balance. The indirect impact of race 
distribution was described in the Coleman Report, which stated 
(1) that the achievement of each racial group increases as the pro-
portion of white students in the school increases, and (2) that 
this resulted "not from racial composition per se, but from the 
better educational background and higher educational aspirations 
that are, on the average, found among white students."247 
It may be unnecessary, however, to rely on the inexact and tran-
sient relationship between race and social class as a basis for pur-
poseful integration. A direct correlation between racial balance and 
student performance was disclosed on re-analysis of the Coleman 
Report data by the United States Civil Rights Commission.248 The 
Commission, while agreeing that social class level influences per-
formance, stated that the racial composition of the student body has 
a separate differential effect.249 The apparent conflict between the 
latter conclusion and Dr. Coleman's conjecture on the same subject 
242. Id. at 302 (emphasis omitted). 
243. Id. at 297, 304-05. 
244. Kaplan, Segregation Litigation and the Schools-Part II: The General North-
ern Problem, 58 Nw. U. L. REv. 157, 209 (1963). 
245. See, e.g., Wilson, Educational Consequences of Segregation in a California 
Community, in app. C-3, U.S. COMMISSION ON CIVIL RIGHTS, RACIAL ISOLATION IN THE 
Ptmuc SCHOOLS (1967); Wilson, Residential Segregation of Social Classes and Aspira-
tions of High School Boys, 24 AM. Soc. REv. 836 (1959). Criticisms of Dr. Coleman's 
procedures have failed to take account of these confirmatory studies. 
246. See Kaplan, supra note 244. 
247. COLEMAN REPORT 307. 
248. U.S. COMMISSION ON CIVIL RIGHTS, RACIAL ISOLATION IN THE PUBLIC SCHOOLS 
(1967) [hereinafter COMMISSION REPORT]. 
249. Id. at 91, 204. 
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does not militate against holding that racial balance is a permis-
sible objective. Courts have deferred to the legislature on threshold 
questions in other areas, despite conflicting evidence from the social 
sciences,250 and this seems entirely proper, for the task of choosing 
between plausible opposing views in defining governmental objec-
tives is primarily for the legislative branch.251 In light of the limits 
of existing knowledge, an official determination· that racial interac-
tion improves the educational product of the school system is en-
titled to similar respect in the Supreme Court.252 
But even if closer review is dictated by the racial nature of the 
purpose to integrate, the results should be the same. Assuming that 
the evidence is too fragmentary to prove that racial isolation per se 
influences student performance, other adverse effects of segregation 
will provide important cumulative support. First, studies have dem-
onstrated that predominantly Negro schools are often academically 
undernourished. The Coleman Report and the Commission Report 
show that Negro students generally have access to fewer books and 
laboratories, attend larger classes, are taught by less capable instruc-
tors, and have fewer curricular and extracurricular programs avail-
able to them.253 Some of these deficiencies may be caused by willful 
state discrimination; others may reflect the interests of students or a 
preference among teachers for middle class schools. In any event, the 
problem might reasonably be attacked by integrating the student 
body. Racial integration would help to insulate minorities both 
250. See the separate opinions of Justice Harlan in Poe v. Ullman, 367 U.S. 
497, 546-47 (1961) (dissenting opinion), and Roth v. United States, 354 U.S. 476, 501-02 
(1957) (concurring opinion), which note the deference given to legislative judgments 
concerning marriage, abortion, sterilization, euthanasia, and similar subjects. 
251. Cf. Standard Oil Co. v. City of Marysville, 279 U.S. 582 (1929); McLean v. 
Arkansas, 211 U.S. 539 (1909). 
252. See Beauharnais v. Illinois, 34!! U.S. 250, 262 (1952). Admittedly, integration 
can be detrimental in the short term. Some children have not been prepared for the 
demands of integrated schools and may experience losses in performance and self-
esteem. The states are entitled, however, to look beyond the immediate effects of 
integration in fixing public policy. It has also been found that "schools bring little 
influence to bear on a child's achievement that is independent of his background and 
general social context." COLEMAN REPORT 325. This finding may reflect the emphasis 
placed on a schoolwide analysis rather than on specific classrooms within the schools, . 
which some have considered a more relevant context. See COMMISSION REPORT, app. 
C-1. In any event, the states may properly decide to exert whatever influence they 
have in favor of improving the education of each student. In doing so, however, they 
should recognize that (1) the adverse effects of integration may preclude the differential 
treatment of Negro children over the objection of their parents, and (2) the finding 
that schools have a minimal impact on achievement calls for a re-examination 
of the casual assumption that the government"s educational function is vastly more 
important than its other functions. 
25!!. COLEMAN REPORT 9, 12; COMMISSION REPORT 92-94. The extent of the dispar-
ities and their effects on student achievement were less than had been assumed. 
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against discriminatory allocation of resources and against fortuitous 
disadvantages emanating from faculty or student preferences. Sec-
ond, there is evidence that segregated education impedes under-
standing between the races and contributes to mutual fear and 
hostility. White persons who attend integrated schools are found to 
be generally more receptive to adult contacts with Negroes, and 
Negro children in such schools are less likely to develop attitudes 
which alienate them from the rest of society.254 Racially balanced 
schools may thus tend to interrupt the self-perpetuating process by 
which segregated education reinforces segregated employment and 
housing patterns, and is in turn reinforced by them. Finally, state 
concern over racial imbalance might be justified by subjective con-
siderations analogous to those which prevailed in Swain v. Ala-
bama.255 If, for example, Negro students interpret de facto segrega-
tion as implying the superiority of the white race, it is likely that 
their self-esteem and motivation will suffer. In the long run those 
subjective feelings may impair achievement, whether or not this is 
indicated by current testing.256 
Yet in spite of the potential academic advantages of integrated 
schools, racial separatists, both white and black, may urge that pur-
poseful integration is objectionable in principle because of its im-
pact on other values. Some Negroes argue that integration restricts 
their freedom of association, adversely affects black culture, and im-
pairs the black student's self-image and sense of security. Claims by 
whites, perhaps more accurately described as fears, appear to be 
based on alleged negative effects on integrated education on middle 
class students. 
Although the objections which blacks advance against purpose-
ful integration are forceful, it should be recognized that some of 
these claims were implicitly rejected by the School Segregation Cases. 
Those cases, though dealing primarily with the desire of southern 
whites not to associate with Negroes, necessarily restrict also the 
freedom of blacks who prefer not to associate with whites. Indeed, 
one of the arguments repeatedly advanced for segregation was that 
Negroes themselves wanted separate facilities. That argument had 
self-serving overtones, but it was widely acknowledged that for many 
254. COMMISSION REPORT 109-10. 
255. 380 U.S. 202 (1965). 
256. "A frequently postulated cause of tlie low achievement levels of Negro youtlis 
is tlieir pessimistic view of tlieir own ability to do better. This discouraging view is 
presumably an inte:cnalization of a social definition of tlieir own wortlI." Wilson, 
Educational Consequences of Segregation in a California Community, in COMMISSION 
REPORT, app. C-3, at 192. 
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Negroes the implementation of Brown and its progeny would mean 
some loss of security and a considerable degree of compulsory as-
sociation with nonblacks.257 Moreover, it was clear even prior to 
Brown that states have the power to enforce racially neutral atten-
dance plans which incidentally increase integration; and while this 
does not establish the validity of purposeful integration, it responds 
sufficiently to the claim of associational freedom. 
A number of objections by whites to integration in principle 
are either tenuous or predicated on transitional difficulties. Social 
science evidence does not support the charges that integration will 
seriously depress the academic performance of white students or that 
it will produce lasting abrasiveness between the integrated groups.258 
Similar opposition, based on the apprehension that white children 
will be unfavorably "influenced" by Negroes, is basically an expres-
sion of white supremacy; those fears are no more persuasive as a 
basis for denying civil rights in schools than they were with respect 
to housing, jobs, and public accommodations.259 
Other objections to purposeful integration, although not ten-
uous, are addressed to problems that are sometimes encountered in 
integrated education but far from inherent in it. The threat to 
black culture and to the self-image of black students which has 
been perceived in integrated schooling is certainly not a necessary 
part of it. Objections of this kind speak to grievous but remediable 
defects, and not to integration in principle. Black spokesmen have 
often recognized this fact and have carefully stated their position 
in terms of "integration as it is currently practiced."260 In any event, 
257. See Green v. County School Bd., 391 U.S. 430 (1968), which rejected freedom 
of choice when other school plans would lead to more effective desegregation. 
258. For a concrete example of school integration which is said to have had neither 
of these effects, see Sullivan, Implementing Equal Education Opportunity, 38 HARV. 
Eouc. REv. 148, 150-51 (1968). 
259. See Jones v. Alfred H. Mayer Co., ~92 U.S. 409 (1968); Heart of Atlanta Motel, 
Inc. v. United States, 379 U.S. 241 (1964). 
260. s. CARMICHAEL &: C. HAMILTON, BLACK POWER 55 (1967). Unlike integrated 
housing, which some blacks see as destroying the political and cultural strength of the 
Negro community, school integration leaves most aspects of the student's life open 
to any all-black activities he and his parents desire. If integrated schools do their 
job properly, and if black organizations continue their efforts to increase black pride, 
the child's self-image and cultural heritage need not be threatened. The current drive 
for black identity, it should be remembered, did not originate in the public schools, 
and the momentum of that drive will probably be easier to sustain than it was to 
develop. 
Nevertheless there are obvious lessons to be drawn from Negro criticisms of inte-
gration. If plans to achieve racial balance do not also include remedies for the stated 
defects, they may lose the indispensable support of the black community and may 
aggravate rather than redress educational deficiencies. 
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it seems likely that even blacks who now favor separatism would 
find no profit in a decision that invalidated in a single stroke all 
attempts at purposeful integration by holding it impermissible in 
principle. A black separatist can easily address his objections to par-
ticular measures which he deems undesirable without attacking the 
constitutionality of purposeful integration-a strategy which will in-
trude far less on the freedom of other blacks to choose for them-
selves and on his own freedom to take a different course should he 
later wish to do so.261 The movement for racial equality has under-
gone numerous tactical changes in a brief period of time, and no one 
can safely assume that there will not be future changes. It seems 
consistent with the need for flexibility; and with the ultimate goals 
of racial justice, to hold that purposeful integration is permissible in 
principle and then to inquire into the validity of specific proposals.262 
B. Methods of Correcting Racial Imbalance 
Although the states have a legitimate interest in the racial com-
position of the schools, it does not necessarily follow that they may 
employ racially differentiated means to advance that interest. Pro-
posals for correcting imbalance vary widely both in their capacity to 
cope with the problem and in the legal issues they present.263 These 
proposals can be divided into three categories. One involves di£-
261. Black spokesmen of every persuasion have been careful to preserve options 
and to insist that the decision of Negroes who seek integration "be supported and 
enforced by the entire American structure." F. McKISSICK, THREE-FIFTHS OF A MAN, 
153 (1969). A contrary view, repudiating all efforts at purposeful integration, would 
subject Negroes in some parts of the country to needless hardship and would give great 
encouragement to those who wish to do nothing about racial inequality. On the other 
hand, certain programs, such as bussing black children far out of their neighborhood, 
have sometimes been opposed because they inhibit parental participation in the child's 
education. Hamilton, Race and Education: A Search for Legitimacy, 38 HARV. Eouc. 
REV. 669, 677 (1968). 
262. Purposeful integration seems to be required by United States v. Montgomery 
County Bd. of Educ., 395 U.S. 225 (1969), in formerly de jure segregated school systems. 
See notes 231 and 237 supra. Perhaps this type of racial classification is peculiarly 
"necessary" in that context because of the history of southern resistance to Brown. See 
McLaughlin v. Florida, 379 U.S. 184 (1964). It would be anomalous, however, to hold 
that purposeful integration is required in the South and not even permissible else• 
where. More probably, the Court will hold that racial classifications are generally less 
objectionable when they merely define governmental objectives than when they arc 
used to allocate benefits or burdens on the basis of color-a distinction applicable to 
cases of racial imbalance. 
263. See generally Hellerstein, The Benign Quota, Equal Protection and "The Rule 
in Shelley's Case", 17 RUTGERS L. REv. 531 (1963); Kaplan, Equal Justice in an Un-
equal World: Equality for the Negro-The Problem of Special Treatment, 61 Nw. 
U. L. REv. 363 (1966); Navasky, The Benevolent I:lousing Quota, 6 How. L.J. 30 
(1960). See also Bittker, supra note 143; Fiss, Racial Imbalance in the Public Schools: 
The Constitutional Concepts, 78 HAAv. L. REv. 564 {1965). 
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ferential treatment of individuals on the basis of race, such as 
permitting only Negroes to transfer out of ghetto schools. The 
other two types of remedies classify groups rather than individuals, 264 
and though calling for less discussion on the question of constitu-
tionality, they may ultimately prove to be more important and more 
feasible measures. 
With regard to the first category, all of the reasons which support 
the objective of integrating the schools are relevant in determining 
whether, as a means to that end, the states may subject individuals 
to racially differentiated treatment. In addition, it is often urged 
that the history of discrimination against Negroes makes continuing 
differential treatment appropriate. This argument, which implies a 
duty rather than freedom to take corrective action, is twofold. It 
relies first on the government's past complicity in racial discrimina-
tion. Official enforcement of restrictive covenants, of segregation, 
and of other discriminatory practices is said to warrant corrective 
measures based on race. Second, the argument relies on the manifest 
privation of Negroes, asserting that because of past prejudice they 
cannot now achieve equality without compensatory treatment.265 A 
color-blind government, it is contended, cannot satisfy present needs, 
much less redress accumulated grievances; instead the government 
must make allowance for the special treatment of those who were 
disadvantaged by more than a century of color-consciousness. 
These contentions have great moral appeal, but they overlook 
many of the risks inherent in racially differentiated treatment-risks 
which are especially grave to Negroes and members of other minority 
groups. Such treatment, even though intended to neutralize dis-
crimination and to achieve educational equality, may actually gen-
erate more private prejudice. Blacks as well as whites may instinc-
tively attribute the preferential treatment of a minority race to a 
low assessment of its capabilities. Racially predicated governmental 
action may thereby appear to confirm the folklore of racism, and it 
cannot be assumed that appearances will give way to underlying 
, subtleties. Furthermore, a principle permitting such action could 
not be easily controlled.266 Courts might demand that racially di£-
264. See notes 291-97 infra and accompanying text. 
265. Remedies for racial imbalance frequently are not regarded as "compensa-
tory"; but if members of only one race are allowed to transfer to a school with a 
higher social clai.s level, there will obviously be a benefit for them and a disability 
for those denied that choice. The notion of compensation is also implicit in other 
remedies and in fields other than education. 
266. See Bittker, supra note 14!l, at 1410-16. 
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ferentiated treatment be "benign" or "benevolent," but neither 
blacks nor other minorities would find protection from discrimina-
tion in those conclusory labels. Experience surely suggests that in 
matters of race what seems benign one year may be exposed as 
invidious the next. The application of so uncertain a standard could 
well produce more racial imbalance rather than less, for as Professor 
Bickel has observed: 
. . . a benevolent quota, like token integration, may be grounded 
in a realistic racism, which desires to continue as much compulsory 
segregation as the authorities can be brought to tolerate. Very oc-
casionally, the racist motive may be provable. For the most part, it 
can only be surmised . . . : The immediate effect of the quota, 
moreover, is the same no matter which motive animates it.267 
Thus, the purposeful assignment of a Negro principal to a partially 
Negro school may be intended either to provide psychological sup-
port for black students or to encourage a trend toward complete 
segregation. A factual determination would entail consideration of 
a great many variables, including teacher and parental attitudes, 
which courts are ill-equipped to measure. When, in addition, the 
economic and educational costs of integration are taken into ac-
count, 268 the judicial task of deciding whether or not differential 
treatment is "benevolent" assumes heroic proportions. 
But the apprehension aroused by racially differentiated treat-
ment of individuals does not rest simply on its susceptibility to mis-
use. A benevolent school quota of seventy whites to thirty blacks, 
for example, is open to criticism, not only on the abstract ground 
that in principle it is indistinguishable from tokenism, but also be-
cause it discriminates solely on the basis of color against both the 
seventy-first white student and the thirty-first Negro student.269 To 
the latter it will be small comfort that his exclusion from preferred 
classrooms is expected to promote the long-range interests of other 
Negroes.270 And the white child whose exclusion protects his race 
against self-damaging concepts of superiority suffers much the same 
injury. White children, it is true, have been found to be generally 
267. A. BICKEL, THE LEAST DANGEROUS BRANCH 62 (1962). 
268. See notes 252 supra and 298 infra. 
269. A flexible quota would pose essentially the same constitutional problem as a 
rigid one, although its discriminatory qualities would be harder to detect. 
270. "[I]t cannot be denied that in its objective operation, a benevolent quota is 
as invidious as straight-out segregation. The difference in immediate effect is that 
some Negroes will not be denied their freedom to associate. But most Negroes will 
be, and the others will be allowed to associate only on the basis of special arrange• 
ments that proclaim their apartness and hence inferiority." A. BICKEL, supra note 267, 
at 61. 
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less sensitive than Negroes to variations in the school quality, and 
their performance may tend to be less affected by changes in social 
class level.271 But to assert that this is usually so does not gainsay that 
in particular cases a white child will be just as responsive to school 
conditions as a Negro child. If he is nevertheless excluded, it is be-
cause of factors which are common to his race, but neither uniquely 
nor universally applicable to it.272 This kind of disability, imposed 
on the basis of racial generalizations, is at odds with the Court's re-
peated emphasis on the "personal and present" nature of equal pro-
tection rights273 and inconsistent with most of the case law from 
Buchanan v. T:Varley274 to Loving v. Virginia.215 
Moreover, it is not clear that the government's previous involve-
ment in discriminatory practices, or the educational needs resulting 
from those practices, can justify othenvise invalid racial disqualifica-
tions. Legislation based on personal need has a long history which 
plainly establishes the constitutionality of compensatory training for 
the disadvantaged. But special treatment of a racial class, drawn to 
include individuals of diverse need and to exclude others of equal 
need, is quite another matter. If compensation is allotted on the 
basis of race, middle class blacks who have escaped at least some of 
the ravages of discrimination will share in limited remedial resources, 
and they will do so at the cost of diminished aid to the poor. On the 
other hand, underprivileged nonblacks who may have been injured 
in substantially similar ways270 will be denied benefits which persons 
271. COLE!l!AN REPORT 297; CoM!IIISSION REPORT 84-86. 
272. The predicament of Mexican-Americans and Puerto Ricans, who do not 
qualify racially for preferences accorded to Negroes but have similar educational 
needs, dramatically illustrates a major defect of this type of classification. The defect 
might be ameliorated by treating members of these groups as "Negroes." But what 
would be the justification for failing to treat lower class "whites" tlie same way? The 
condition of not sharing one's disabilities with other members of a readily identifiable 
class scarcely seems a suitable basis for unfavorable governmental treatment. But see 
text accompanying notes 158-69 supra. 
273. "[P]etitioner's right [to attend a state law school] was a personal one. It was 
as an individual that he was entitled to the equal protection of the laws • • • ." 
Missouri ex rel. Gaines v. Canada, 305 U.S. 337, 351 (1938). To the same effect see 
Sweatt v. Painter, 339 U.S. 629 (1950); Sipuel v. Board of Regents of the Univ. of 
Ok.la., 332 U.S. 631 (1948); McCabe v. Atchison, T. & S.F. Ry., 235 U.S. 151 (1941). Al-
though this rule was developed during the decline of the separate but equal doc-
trine, it continues to be applicable in the post-Brown era. Watson v. City of Memphis, 
373 U.S. 526, 532-33 (1963). 
274. 245 U.S. 60 (1917). 
275. 388 U.S. 1 (1967). For a use of numerical ratios which do not require racially 
differentiated treatment of individuals, see United States v. Montgomery County Bd. 
of Educ., 395 U.S. 225 (1969); notes 227-38 supra and accompanying text. 
276. "[T]hough, with respect to the Negro member of [the] underclass, it is rela-
tively easy to isolate specific types of deprivation at the hands of society and thereby 
explain their present status, the chances are that if we examine all the other mem-
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of the same means, but of a different color, are accorded. Under the 
theory relying on prior governmental discrimination, the validity of 
corrective racial differentiation would apparently vary with the state's 
antecedent race policies. In a mobile society in which bigotry has not 
been uniform, this rule would be bound to produce anomalous re-
sults. 277 But more fundamentally, the government's past involvement 
in discriminatory practices is simply not relevant to the claim of the 
individual who is prejudiced by differential treatment and who was 
not himself implicated in the previous wrongdoing, save in the col-
lective sense in which we are all morally responsible for permitting 
official discrimination to permeate our society.278 
Finally, it has been urged that the "most important" objection 
to this type of classification is that it "weakens the government as 
an educative force."279 It has taken the better part of half a century 
to establish the requirements of equality that characterize the race 
relations cases. In voting,280 education,281 job opportunity,282 hous-
ing,283 and other areas284 the Court has repeatedly invoked the princi-
ple that difference~_in ra_c:e __ clo not warrant differences in official 
treatmentoCinclividuals. A decision upholding a benevolent quota 
would undermine that principle in both the public and the private 
bers, we will find that each of them, in one way or another, has somehow been in• 
jured by our society." Kaplan, supra note 263, at 374. 
277. Often the minority group members most in need of preferential treatment 
are those who were forced to move from a state which practiced severe discrimination 
to one which did not. Furthermore, anomalous results cannot be avoided by charging 
discriminatory practices to the national government, for the local effects of federal 
discrimination vary as much as local practices. 
278. Analogies have been drawn to the special treatment of women and to the 
disestablishment of company-dominated labor unions, See P. FREUND, ON LAw AND 
JUSTICE 46 (1968); Kaplan, supra note 263, at 365, But in those situations the classify-
ing trait was racially neutral. Women often can be treated differently from men in 
circumstances in which Negroes and whites must be treated alike. See, e.g., Hoyt v. 
Florida, 368 U.S. 57 (1961), upholding a provision limiting jury service by women to 
volunteer registrants, Similarly the disenfranchisement of members of a company• 
dominated union is quite different from the disenfranchisement or other differential 
treatment of a racial group. 
In any event, it is interesting to note that the current emphasis on black pride 
and independence seems to have aroused Negro opposition to racial preferences. A 
recent survey found that blacks, "by an overwhelming 84-10 per cent, reject the idea 
of preferential treatment ••• in reparation for past injustices," NEWSWEEK, June 30, 
1969, at 20. 
279. Kaplan, supra note 263, at 379. 
280. E.g., Smith v. Allwright, 321 U.S. 649 (1944). 
281. Brown v. Board of Educ., 347 U.S. 483 (1954). 
282. Colorado Anti-Discrimination Commn. v. Continental Air Lines, Inc,, 372 U.S. 
714 (1963). 
283. Reitman v. Mulkey, 387 U.S. 369 (1967); Shelley v. Kraemer, 334 U.S. 1 (1948). 
284. E.g., Watson v. City of Memphis, 373 U.S. 526 (1963): Burton v. Wilmington 
Parking Authority, 365 U.S. 715 (1961). 
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domain.285 Such a decision would imply that there are important 
differences between the races, apparent if not real, and that those 
differences are sufficient to justify governmental action which per-
force must be described as racially discriminatory. If this premise is 
accepted in order that fair-minded officials may allocate more bene-
fits to a racial minority than it now receives, will there be any 
principled basis on which to prevent future officials from allocating 
fewer benefits to such a group? A quota which aids a particular 
minority today may handicap that minority when its members be-
come successful in disproportionate numbers.286 And even while the 
quota remains "benevolent," it is likely to operate at the expense of 
another group which has essentially the same needs. A system so 
administered seems certain to be highly divisive and to dilute the 
political strength of all minority groups by placing their interests 
in sharp conflict. 
Perhaps the risks inherent in racially differentiated treatment of 
individuals would be justified if no other effective way could be 
found to attack inequality. But other means, which can achieve as 
much as benevolent quotas while risking less, are available to any 
legislature that has the will to employ them.287 Congress and the 
states have broad power to correct the effects of past discrimination 
through racially neutral legislation. The Voting Rights Act of 
1965,288 for example, precludes certain states from using literacy 
tests, however impartially administered, when those tests specially 
burden Negroes because of separate and unequal education.289 This 
legislation is racially neutral inasmuch as it relieves all citizens of 
285. The loss of "educative force" may be less than has been supposed, when due 
regard is given to the decisions which have already upheld racial distinctions. But it 
seems fair to say that the educative impact would be greater here than it was in the 
jury cases, in which racial classificatiort was less visible, or in the cases of federal dis-
crimination, in which exceptional circumstances were pleaded. 
286. See N. AnRAMS, FOREWORD TO EQUALITY ix (1965), for an illustration of a 
quota that was used to restrict a successful ethnic minority. 
287. A legislature which fails to make use of its present authority is unlikely to 
apply a racial quota in the manner intended by its proponents. On the other hand, 
many officials who are sympathetic to the demands of minority groups may utilize 
benign quotas without case support. Accordingly, even if racially differentiated action 
were deemed necessary, it might still be imprudent for the Supreme Court to 
legitimate the practice formally. See Korematsu v. United States, 323 U.S. 214, 246 
(1944) (dissenting opinion), in which Justice Jackson noted the difference between 
racial discrimination by the Executive, which he called "an incident," and its valida· 
tion by the Court, which he said leaves a constitutional principle lying "about like a 
loaded weapon ready for the hand of any authority that can bring forward a plausi-
ble claim of an urgent need." 
288. 42 U.S.C. § I973b(c) (Supp. IV 1965-1968). 
289. Gaston County v. United States, 895 U.S. 285 (1969). 
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the literacy requirement, but it benefits primarily those who have 
been subjected to discrimination in the past and who would con-
tinue to suffer under a rigorous literacy standard. The approach 
taken in the Voting Rights Act is open to wide application. State 
universities, for instance, can admit on a nonracial basis students 
who, because of previous disadvantages, do not qualify under the 
existing admissions requirements; and public employers can adopt 
analogous hiring practices.200 In circumstances in which preferences 
are necessary to remedy existing inequalities, differential treatment 
can be based directly on need. Corrective action which meets the 
needs of black people, while also responding to the fact that those 
needs are shared by nonblacks, will be less divisive than racial quotas 
and far less vulnerable to misuse. At the same time, a compensatory 
policy which embraces all persons similarly situated will be more 
likely to gain political support and less likely to be judged paternalis-
tic by its beneficiaries. 
The other two categories of corrective action mentioned earlier 
require only brief comment. One group of remedies disregards the 
race of individuals and deals with neighborhoods instead. This 
approach, which has the debatable advantage of obscuring the gov-
ernment's policy to classify racially, can be implemented by site se-
lection, rezoning, and selective bussing.291 In each case it is possible 
to formulate a program of neighborhood classification which in 
effect constitutes a pure subterfuge. For example, transforming com-
munity boundaries from a geographical square to "an uncouth 
twenty-eight-sided figure"292 may be tantamount to differential treat-
290. Difficult questions can be raised concerning the wisdom of these policies in 
specific situations. Such questions belong, however, in the political rather than the 
constitutional sphere. 
In Gaston County v. United States, 395 U.S. 285 (1969), the Court had no occasion 
to consider whether Congress could abolish literacy tests for persons who received 
separate, unequal education and still retain such tests for other citizens. A classifica-
tion of that kind would be underinclusive, since it would not reach persons poorlj 
educated in nonseparate schools. But for the same reason, the classification is not 
precisely racial-all persons attending nonseparate schools would be treated alike. A 
classification reaching persons who have been "subjected to racial discrimination" 
would avoid some of the constitutional barriers to racially differentiated treatment, 
but it might invite the same political repercussions and would be difficult to ad-
minister. 
291. The effectiveness of these measures has been explored elsewhere. See Fiss, 
supra note 263, at 570-74. Some remedies, such as site selection and the pairing of 
imbalanced schools, are helpful in small communities but not in metropolitan areas 
where the problem is most acute; other measures depend, perhaps unrealistically, on 
the und:erutilization of racially balanced schools or on student and parental initiative. 
Bussing and rezoning which sacrifice geographic compactness create strong resistance 
and may result in the withdrawal of white students to private or suburban schools. 
292. Gomillion v. Lightfoot, 364 U.S. 339, 340 (1960). 
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ment of individuals, and hence may raise the same issues as the first 
group of remedies. The challenging question is whether, such ex-
treme cases aside, it is permissible to select neighborhoods for assign-
ment to a given school district on the basis of their racial composi-
tion.203 Supreme Court decisions do not indicate a difference of 
constitutional dimensions between neighborhood and individual 
classification by race. Yet, to many observers, differential treatment 
seems to be less offensive when it embodies judgments in gross. 
Racial classification of neighborhoods would call for like treatment 
of all people within a given geographical area and would not involve 
courts in the obnoxious business of determining a person's race. 
Moreover, it may be impossible in many areas to eliminate racial 
imbalance without some classification of this kind, and consequently 
future cases may conceivably yield to that pressure. 
The last group of remedies does not involve racial classification 
of either neighborhoods or individuals within a school system. Under 
these remedies, integration is produced by establ'ishing central schools 
that draw students from all neighborhoods within the system or else 
the racial distribution of students is altered by voluntary transfers, 
random assignments, open enrollment, or free choice plans.294 These 
corrective measures classify by race· in the sense that a purpose of the 
state's action is to affect the racial composition of schools. But if, as 
suggested above, integration is a legitimate governmental goal,295 
remedies of this kind seem constitutionally unassailable. 
Thus, some remedies for racial imbalance will not encounter any 
decisive legal barrier,296 although they will be subject to political 
293. The distinction between gerrymandering which produces a twenty-eight-sided 
figure and gerrymandering which yields a compact geographic unit is subtle. Presum-
ably the latter serves interests other than integration, and it has the appearance of 
being less arbitrary. In any case, segregated housing patterns may make neighborhood 
classification seem qualitatively similar to individual classification. 
294. Some plans to consolidate a range of grade levels on a central campus, called 
an educational park or plaza, have also proposed that students be drawn from adja-
cent school districts. See Fischer, The School Park, in COMMISSION REPORT, app. D-2, 
at 253-60. Although there are conceptual similarities between redefining the bound-
aries of a school system and rezoning neighborhoods within tl1e system, the educa-
tional park may properly be included in the last group of remedies. Establishment 
of the park is certain to involve nonracial considerations which insulate against 
discrimination, and it is far removed from racially differentiated treatment of indi-
viduals. Whereas racial considerations are often paramount in rezoning neighbor-
hoods, they are submerged in the concept of educational parks. 
295. See notes 241-62 supra and accompanying text. 
296. These remedies would, of course, impinge on the student's freedom of as-
sociation, as would any effort to alter the composition of the schools. But the School 
Segregation Cases show that there is no general right to avoid undesired contacts in 
public schools, and it has never been thought that the neighborhood school policy is 
unconstitutional because it forces children in a common zone to attend classes to-
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limitations, as well as to limitations in effectiveness and economic 
resources. There is reason to doubt that the political processes could 
operate at the present time to impose a school program which a sub-
stantial majority of the community believed would disadvantage 
their children. There is even greater reason to doubt that such a 
program could succeed, if adopted. The plan for integration that 
seems most likely to win essential public support is not one which 
calls for sacrifice by some groups for the benefit of others, however 
much that may comport with one's sense of justice in particular cir-
cumstances, but rather one which visibly operates to the mutual 
benefit of all groups.297 A plan of the latter description is likely to en-
gage no constitutional difficulty. 
C. Black Separatism As a Means to Educational Equality 
The discussion to this point has concentrated on attempts to 
achieve racial balance and thereby to promote equal opportunity in 
the schools. But integration is at best a slow and partial answer to 
the problem of unequal education. Even the most conscientious 
efforts to integrate the schools will fail for some years to reach many 
of the children in urban ghettos. Furthermore, integration will in-
volve transitional problems of academic and social adjustment; and 
most significantly, it is sometimes perceived by Negroes as an expres-
sion of white superiority, as a threat to black cultural heritage, and 
as a drain on the resources of the Negro community.298 Other ap-
proaches to educational equality have therefore been explored. The 
new militancy, which represents a growing segment of Negro 
thought, but should not be mistaken for its entirety, urges for the 
present time a policy of black control of black institutions. 
Although in the field of education, as elsewhere, proposals for 
what may loosely be called "black separatism"299 have been wide-
ranging, there is a core of illustrative specifics on which attention 
can be focused. These include demands for all-Negro dormitories 
and "autonomous" black studies programs at the college level, and 
gether. It is difficult therefore to maintain that associational guarantees forbid the 
purposeful inclusion of "non-neighbors" in particular schools. 
297. Assuming its economic and educational feasibility, the educational park might 
meet this standard. The park not only would provide integration, but it would offer 
to all students advantages of technology, specialized curriculum, counseling, and other 
services which no single school could afford. 
298. See s. CARMICHAEL & c. HAMILTON, supra note 260, at 53-55. 
299. The term is used here merely as a convenient way to describe a collection of 
diverse programs. Some Negroes may prefer the term "black nationalism," and others 
may endorse specific policies but reject both terms. 
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for Negro principals and, more generally, black control of black 
community schools at pre-college levels. Since there has been no re-
ported case involving these programs and little experience with their 
operation, it is hazardous to predict how the Court will deal with 
them. But black separatism raises such urgent issues-ones which 
lower courts will soon face-that at least a preliminary analysis, 
based on decisions concerning other racial classifications, should be 
offered. 
Because proposals for separatism have been associated with the 
black power movement, and because of the emotion aroused by that 
movement, the purposes of this kind of segregation are often mis-
understood. Unlike traditional caste segregation, black separatism 
does not appear to have as its goal the subjugation of racial classes, 
although its treatment of individuals, as distinguished from groups, 
sometimes bears painful similarity to the discriminatory treat-
ment of Negroes. The immediate aim of black separatism is said to 
be the elimination of social practices which operate as subtle instru-
ments of white racism. In the primary and secondary schools the 
emphasis has been on decentralization and community control. The 
main objectives evidently are (1) to secure parent involvement in 
the operation of the schools;800 (2) to make the educational system 
accountable and responsive to the community through the local 
election of administrators and governing boards; (3) to support the 
self-image of black students by hiring black personnel, especially 
black principals; and (4) to control curriculum, academic standards, 
and the selection of instructional materials as a means of assuring 
suitable treatment of subjects such as Negro history and Afro-Amer-
ican culture.301 The themes that run throughout these proposals 
and the demands for black studies and segregated dormitories are 
the promotion of black pride and group solidarity, the accountability 
of schools, and greater responsiveness to black needs. Control of edu-
cational institutions, some advocates believe, will meet the threat to 
the black cultural heritage and to the manpower resources of the 
ghetto. It may also stimulate other political activities in the black 
community, leading to control over welfare, health, and law enforce-
300. This new responsibility may have favorable effects on parents themselves and 
will provide them with experience which they can apply in other areas. If a sense of 
control is also transmitted to the child, it may improve his ability to learn, since the 
CoLEMAN REPORT found that the feeling of control over environment is highly re-
lated to the scholastic achievement of minority groups. COLEMAN REPORT 23. Con• 
versely, programs which are imposed from outside and which are not supported by 
parents may increase alienation in the black community rather than reduce it, 
301. For a detailed account of these objectives see Hamilton, supra note 261. 
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ment services. Finally, there is often a suggestion, sometimes implicit 
and sometimes explicit, that when the black community has achieved 
appropriate economic and political power it can consider policies of 
meaningful integration on a basis of parity with the white com-
munity. 
Insofar as the proposed educational reforms involve only a re-
allocation of existing state power, they encounter no serious difficulty 
under the Federal Constitution. There may well be some constitu-
tional restrictions against a redistribution of authority which is 
clearly designed to effectuate an impermissible purpose, such as pre-
venting compliance with a court order to desegregate.302 But state 
discretion in apportioning responsibility among various government 
agencies is extremely broad. In fact, decentralization of schools in 
metropolitan areas is no different, constitutionally, from the local 
control which is currently exercised by suburban school boards 
throughout the country. Absent evidence of an unconstitutional ob-
jective, which has not been apparent here, the states may decide for 
themselves whether to govern the schools through a citywide board 
of education or through a number of smaller boards. For the same 
reasons, a university can choose to exercise authority through self-
regulating departments rather than through a more centralized 
office.sos 
A constitutional problem emerges, however, when demands are 
made for the adoption of policies of racial segregation and discrim-
ination rather than for changes in governing structure. Racially 
separate dormitories and all-Negro departments of black studies may 
serve some of the psychological and cultural ends already described. 
The segregated dormitory also responds to the sense of isolation 
which black students may experience in a university environment. 
Some of these students feel that predominantly white dormitories 
are hostile and inappropriate living quarters.304 Similarly, the 
presence of white students or teachers in black studies classrooms is 
said to cause embarrassment when sensitive topics, such as family 
patterns in the ghetto or crime and illegitimacy rates, are dis-
cussed.3015 It is often felt that a Negro teacher will have a better 
302. Cf. Griffin v. County School Bd., 377 U.S. 218 (1964). 
303. Autonomy may also be granted to some departments-as the American As-
sociation of Law Schools asks for its member schools-whether or not it is granted to 
others. A black studies faculty can be given special autonomy as long as the decision 
to do so is based on reasonable criteria. 
304. See Dunbar, The Black Studies Thing, N.Y. Times, April 6, 1969, § 6 (Maga-
zine), at 25. 
305. Id. 
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understanding of ghetto life and will be better able to relate to it.306 
At any rate, if a class believes that this is so, the learning process 
may be affected, since student confidence is vital to the success of a 
teacher. Thus, the articulated aims of black separatism are important 
and challenging even when they entail racial separation. 
But in spite of these important aims, the cases on racial classifica-
tion suggest an uneasy constitutional future for governmental pro-
grams of this nature.307 The difficulties begin with the school 
decisions. The Court clearly stated in Bolling v. Sharpe that "[s]egre-
gation in public education is not reasonably related to any proper 
governmental objective .... "808 Taken at face value, that statement 
could consign official policies of black separatism to an immediate 
demise. Yet it seems hard to justify such a statement in view of the 
objectives of black separatism outlined above. Few would deny the 
propriety of those objectives, and it is far from self-evident that 
racial separation is unrelated to them. Perhaps the Bolling statement, 
which had questionable validity even in the context in which it was 
announced, should be re-examined in light of the constitutional test 
announced in l\fcLaughlin v. Florida.800 The Court in that case 
found that racial classifications cannot be upheld unless they are 
necessary, rather than merely related, to an overriding legislative 
purpose.310 Under that analysis the racial exclusions at issue in 
Bolling would fall because they served no "overriding" purpose, 
but it might be argued that black separatism serves different interests 
and should be permitted. 
Nevertheless, even assuming McLaughlin is controlling, the 
Court may still strike down official policies of Negro-inspired segre-
gation. First, it will be difficult to show that segregation is necessary 
to achieve the goals of black separatism. Other ways can probably be 
found to support psychological and cultural needs and to assure a 
classroom atmosphere conducive to learning. Second, McLaughlin 
requires that the purpose of a racial classification be overriding in 
relation to the harm "incurred by the affected private parties."811 
306. Cf. K. CLAIUC, DARK GHETIO 132-37 (1965). 
307. In order to stay within manageable limits, the discussion here will concen-
trate on the cases most likely to be deemed controlling. For one pertinent line of 
decisions see text accompanying note 126 supra, suggesting a pointed analogy between 
the rationale of some federal Indian case law and the determination of blacks to pre-
serve their cultural heritage. But see text accompanying notes 142-43 supra. 
308. 347 U.S. 497, 500 (1954). 
309. 379 U.S. 184 (1964). See note 189 supra and accompanying text. 
310. 379 U.S. at 192. 
311. Developments in the Law-Equal Protection, 82 HARv. L. REv. 1067, 1103 
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The focus in this connection is on the objections to separatism that 
might be raised by blacks who favor integration, by whites, and by 
members of nonblack minorities. 
A Negro1s racial affinity to the group demanding separation will 
not, of course, preclude his attack on black separation.312 Nor should 
it be assumed that because the new segregation is Negro-inspired it 
commands universal support within the Negro community. A num-
ber of blacks have already taken a strong public position against 
separatism. The views of Dr. Kenneth Clark bear lengthy quotation, 
since they are representative of this body of opinion: 
Within the past two years another formidable and insidious 
barrier in the way of the movement towards effective, desegregated 
public schools has emerged in the form of the black power move-
ment and its demands for racial separatism . . . . These demands 
are clearly a rejection of the goals of integrated education and a re-
turn to the pursuit of the myth of an efficient "separate but equal"-
or the pathetic wish for a separate and superior-racially-organized 
system of education. One may view this current trend whereby some 
Negroes themselves seem to be asking for a racially segregated sys-
tem of education as a reflection of the frustration resulting from 
white resistance to genuine desegregation of the public schools since 
the Brown decision and as a reaction to the reality that the quality 
of education in the de facto segregated Negro schools in the North 
and the Negro schools in the South has steadily deteriorated under 
the present system of white control. 
In spite of these explanations, the demands for segregated schools 
can be no more acceptable coming from Negroes than they are 
coming from white segregationists. There is no reason to believe 
and certainly there is no evidence to support the contention that 
all-Negro schools, controlled by Negroes, will be any more efficient 
in preparing American children to contribute constructively to the 
realities of the present and future world.313 
The chief argument of black integrationists, then, is that racial 
separation is educationally counter-productive. Because past dis-
(1969). It should be noted in applying McLaughlin that the segregative aspects of 
black separatism seem generally to require racially differentiated treatment of indi-
viduals and may be subject to closer review than purposeful integration, which some• 
times does not involve such treatment. See notes 234-37 supra and accompanying text. 
312. Whites were allowed to object to anti-miscegenation and cohabitation laws, 
notwithstanding their participation in the political processes that produced those 
laws, Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1 (1967); McLaughlin v. Florida, 379 U.S. 184 (1964), 
and blacks will likewise be heard on the issue of separatism. 
313. Alternative Public School Systems, 38 HARV. Eouc. REV. 100, 103-04 (1968). 
Similar views have been expressed by Roy Wilkins and Bayard Rustin. See N.Y. Times, 
Jan. 14, 1969, § 1, at 1, col. 7; N.Y. Times, April 28, 1969, § 1, at 17, col. 6. 
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crimination has subjected large numbers of Negroes to economic 
disadvantage, racial isolation at the present time would result in 
social class isolation, and so lead to the educational detriment de-
scribed in the Coleman Report.314 There is a serious danger, more-
over, that Negro demands for separatism may be manipulated by 
white supremacists to maintain their own brand of segregation. In-
deed, the judicial task of determining the real source of segrega-
tionist preferences-black nationalism or the color caste system-
seems insurmountable. The underlying premise of black separatism, 
that minorities can secure official segregation but the majority can-
not, is equally perilous. On that basis whites who constitute a minor-
ity in their local area could demand segregated facilities, while ap-
parently Negroes could not.315 Some blacks may therefore contend 
that separatism has the potential to become an unconscious ally of 
white supremacy, an ally scarcely less invidious for being advocated 
by the most militant of Negroes.316 
White students may also object to racially differentiated treat-
ment, whether in black studies programs or in segregated dormi-
tories. Their exclusion from black studies on grounds unrelated to 
academic qualification involves obvious disadvantages; whites, like 
blacks, may be interested in Negro history or in studying under 
Negro teachers. But even when dual facilities are "equal," as in the 
case of segregated dormitories, white students may challenge their 
differential treatment.317 As Professor Wechsler has pointed out, 
whites as well as blacks suffer from racial segregation, although in 
314. Brown v. Board of Educ. was sweeping in its appraisal of the effect of gov• 
emment-enforced separation: "Separate educational facilities are inherently unequal." 
347 U.S. 483, 495 (1954) (emphasis added). The hope of black separatism fa that segrega• 
tion will not inflict permanent damage when it is sought by the minority rather than 
prescribed by the majority, and that the consequences of racial isolation may be 
attenuated at the college level, But see N.Y. Times, May 23, 1969, § 1, at 29, col. 6, in 
which Dr. Clark rejects the notion that "exclusion on the basis of race is any less 
damaging when demanded or enforced by the previous victims than when imposed 
by the dominant group.'' For a case applying the Brown theory of inherent in-
equality to a state university, see Florida ex rel. Hawkins v. Board of Control, 350 
U.S. 413 (1956) (per curiam). 
315. See Anderson v. Martin, 375 U.S. 399 (1964), striking down a racial classifica, 
tion which would prejudice whichever race was in the local minority. It is well to 
recall that in many regions where Negroes are presently a minority they will probably 
compose a majority in the foreseeable future. 
316. The arguments of the black integrationist cannot be met merely by allowing 
him to withdraw from an all-Negro black studies program. He may properly object 
to being forced to choose between segregation and the relinquishment of desired 
academic courses. Furthermore, official sponsorship of separate programs for Negroes 
could combine with pressures from fellow students to make his choice more illusory 
than free. 
317. Cf. Buchanan v. Warley, 245 U.S. 60 (1917). 
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different ways and for different reasons. 318 Hence a southern white 
should be free to object, for example, to his exclusion from the back 
of a state-operated bus or, in the case at hand, from a "Negro school" 
or a "Negro dormitory." The Supreme Court has in fact already per-
mitted members of both races to challenge the racial segregation of 
public records,319 despite the apparent "equality" of treatment.820 
Finally, the case for nonexclusion of other minorities is perhaps 
the easiest to make. Their claims against discrimination by Negroes 
are strikingly similar to the claims which Negroes have legitimately 
made against discrimination by whites. Mexican-Americans, Indians, 
and Orientals may properly urge that in an all-Negro black studies 
department they are denied equality by a racial class which is larger 
and politically more powerful than themselves. It is difficult to 
see how courts could justify these exclusions while still holding, as 
they should, that whites cannot exclude blacks from government-
sponsored activities. 
But even if the Constitution restricts official enforcement of 
Negro-inspired segregation, it will not foreclose the implementation 
of black separatist programs. Those programs can be advanced in 
much the same way that inequality is thrust upon N egroes--through 
private or "fortuitous" black separatism. The neighborhood school 
plan, which has relegated Negro children to segregated education by 
racially neutral criteria, can be employed by blacks for community 
control systems which are equally neutral as to race. Simila<y, the 
general immunity of private organizations to constitutional restraints 
can protect not only the local country club, but also black action 
groups which can work effectively for black pride and solidarity 
without official sponsorship. It will even be possible to achieve a 
large degree of racial separation, if that is found to be desirable.321 
318. Wechsler, supra note 38, at 34. Both groups will suffer more if, as the Civil 
Rights Commission found, segregation operates to reinforce mutual fears and hostil-
ities. 
319. Tancil v. Woolls, 379 U.S. 19 (1964) (per curiam). See text accompan;ing 
notes 217-19 supra. 
320. The objections of qualified white teachers and principals to racial restrictions 
on job opportunity require no commentary. See Colorado Anti-Discrimination Commn. 
v. Continental Air Lines, In.:., 372 U.S. 714, 721 (1963), observing that "any state or 
federal law requiring applicants for any job to be turned away because of their color 
would be invalid under the Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment and the 
Due Process and Equal Protection Clauses of the Fourteenth Amendment." 
321. The wisdom of separatist policies, as distinguished from their constitutional-
ity, is not considered here. For a current discussion of nonlegal issues, see Lewis, 
The Road to the Top Is Through Higher Education-Not Black Studies, N.Y. Times, 
May 11, 1969. § 6 (Magazine), at 34, which raises questions as to whether separatism 
can prepare blacks for the best jobs and whether whites are not more in need of 
black studies than are Negroes. 
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Assuming no governmental involvement, students are probably free 
to segregate themselves in dormitories or college classes by the exer-
cise of genuine free choice.322 Separation might also result from state 
action which does not classify racially. For example, students in some 
black studies courses might be selected on the basis of their previous 
exposure to ghetto life or other special qualifications.323 
Given the limits of present knowledge, courts will probably 
hesitate to take a rigid attitude toward any tenable means of pro-
moting racial equality. Conceivably some degree of self-imposed 
separation may ultimately facilitate integration. Black power advo-
cates have emphasized that "[b Jefore a group can enter the open 
society, it must first close ranks."324 This statement seems to imply 
that after Negroes have developed their own strengths, and after 
cultural diversity has been accepted in a positive way and not as an 
obstruction to "assimilation," it will be possible for those so desiring 
to enter an integrated society. Viewed in those terms, black sep-
aratism-the closing of ranks--may become compatible rather than 
inconsistent with long-term integration. But unlike a number of 
plans for early integration, black separatism carries an inevitable 
risk of reinforcing traditional segregation patterns. Accordingly, sep-
aratist solutions, even when constitutionally permissible, will be ap-
proached by the courts with extreme caution. 
X. CONCLUSION 
It seems clear that the state and federal governments have broad 
power to answer the educational needs of black people and of 
disadvantaged members of other groups, and in order to do so they 
appear to have some power to classify by race. But the Supreme 
Court has not articulated a clear neutral standard by which to 
measure the limits of permissible racial classification. In view of 
past experience with governmental use of racial criteria, it is under-
standable that the Court should act with great precaution, even 
though this sometimes leads to results which are inadequately ex-
322. "There is a vast difference-a Constitutional difference-between restrictions 
imposed by the state which prohibit the intellectual co-mingling of students, and the 
refusal of individuals to co-mingle where the state puts no such bar." McLaurin v. 
Oklahoma State Regents, 339 U.S. 637, 641 (1950). 
323. This is substantially the position taken by the Department of Health, Ed-
ucation, and Welfare in enforcing title VI of the Civil Rights Act of 1964. N.Y. 
Times, May 3, 1969, § 1, at 1, col. 7. Close vigilance will be required if "special 
qualifications" are not to be used as a subterfuge for racial disabilities. 
32·1. s. CARMICHAEL 8: C. HAMILTON, supra note 260, at 44 (italics omitted). 
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plained or which are not explained at all.325 But if the tendency 
toward unexplained results is understandable in terms of preserving 
judicial options, it should also be recognized that the failure to ex-
plain, and thereby confine, can be even more threatening than fully 
reasoned authority permitting racial considerations. At any rate, in 
developing more precise standards and in responding to specific 
issues, reliance must be placed upon a close analysis of the racial 
classifications which have already been presented to the Court. 
325. See, e.g., United States v. Montgomery County Bd. of Educ., 395 U.S. 225 
(1969); Tancil v. Woolls, 379 U.S. 19 (1964) (per curiam). Swain v. Alabama, 380 U.S. 
202 (1965), illustrates the carefully considered opinion which tries at times to conceal 
more than it reveals about permissible classification by race. See note 179 supra. 
